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Abstract
This paper investigates empirically how similarity of demand structures – approximated by similar-
ity of income distributions – affects trade patterns along both the extensive and intensive margin.
The idea that similarity of demand structures intensifies trade goes back to the well-known Linder
hypothesis. Based on a sample of 102 countries, I find that bilateral trade volumes are increasing
in the overlap of two countries income distributions. This effect is driven by both the extensive and
intensive margin. I establish two novel measures of income similarity – the average income level of
the overlap area and the range of incomes for which two distributions overlap – and document that
both are important determinants of bilateral trade margins. My analysis shows that the positive
relationship between similarity of income distributions and bilateral trade margins is present at the
aggregate and disaggregate level of trade flows.
JEL classification: F10, D31, F14
Keywords: similarity of income distributions, Linder hypothesis, nonhomothetic preferences, ex-
tensive and intensive margin of trade, gravity equation
∗I thank Reto Foellmi, Christian Hepenstrick, Andreas Kohler, James Markusen, Marc Melitz, Josef Zweimu¨ller and
seminar participants at University of Zurich and Basel for helpful comments and discussions. I gratefully acknowledge
financial support by the Forschungskredit der Universita¨t Zu¨rich and the Swiss National Science Foundation.
†University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Muehlebachstrasse 86, CH-8008 Zurich, e-mail: clau-
dia.bernasconi@econ.uzh.ch
1
1 Introduction
The gravity equation identified many determinants of trade flows, such as distance and economic sizes.
Recently, a growing literature focused on the role of demand side forces for the patterns of trade, such
as per capita income and within-country income distribution. This paper extends this literature by
showing that not only the distribution of income per se matters but that bilateral trade flows are also
determined by the extent to which two income distributions are similar.
This paper investigates empirically how similarity of demand structures – approximated by simi-
larity of income distributions – affects trade patterns along the extensive and intensive margin. The
idea that similarity of demand structures intensifies trade has a long tradition in the economic litera-
ture, going back to the well-known Linder hypothesis. According to Linder (1961) countries produce
those goods for which domestic demand is large as proximity to demand serves as a comparative
advantage. He argued that this congruence of consumption and production patterns intensifies trade
among countries with similar demand structures.
Contrasting Japan’s imports from Canada to Japan’s imports from Mexico illustrates the type of
comparison on which the empirical analysis is based.1 In 2002, Japan imports consumer goods from
Canada worth 1.2 billion US$ and from Mexico for less than half as much. At the same time, Japan has
a larger overlap with Canada’s than with Mexico’s income distribution. The overlap, the main measure
of similarity, is the minimum integral of two income distributions. Hence, Japan imports more from
the source country which is more similar. Moreover, the higher import value from Canada is driven by
both margins. While Japan’s imports from Canada are composed of 671 different products (HS 6-digit
codes) its imports from Mexico consist of 377 categories. Thus, Japan imports a larger diversity of
goods – the extensive margin – from the exporter which has a more similar income distribution. On
average, in a given product category Japan imports goods from Canada for 1.8 million US$ and from
Mexico for 1.4 million US$. Hence, also Japan’s intensive margin of imports is higher from the source
country with the more resembling income distribution.
This paper makes two major contributions. First, this is, to the best of my knowledge, the first
study which decomposes the effect of income similarity on trade flows into effects at the extensive
and intensive margin. Second, this paper is among the very first which approximate similarity of
demand patterns with similarity of income distributions – as opposed to similarity of average incomes
– in order to relate it to bilateral trade.2 Furthermore, I make two methodological contributions. On
the one hand, beyond using the overlap (minimum integral) of two income distributions to quantify
similarity, I establish two novel measures which characterize the overlap area – the average income
level and the width of the overlap. On the other hand, I develop a new way of computing national
1In 2002, Canada and Mexico have approximately the same GDP and are equally far away from Japan.
2Searching for the keywords “income distribution” & “similarity” & “trade” on EconLit, for example, does not give
one single reference to such a study. Two related working papers, which are not in EconLit, are discussed below.
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income distributions with data on decile and quintile income shares and per capita income. The simple
procedure imposes no parametric assumptions about the functional form of the distributions.
The three main findings of this paper provide comprehensive and consistent evidence that similarity
of demand structures is an important determinant of bilateral trade margins. First, the more similar
two countries are regarding their income distributions, the higher is their aggregate bilateral trade
volume in consumer goods. The effect of similarity on trade volumes is driven by both the extensive and
intensive margin. The magnitudes of the effects are economically relevant. On average, countries with
a one standard deviation higher overlap have a 35% higher trade value, trade a 22% more diversified
bundle of goods (extensive margin) and trade 13% more within a given set of goods (intensive margin).
Hence, the patterns of the Japan-Canada versus Japan-Mexico example above are systematic for a
sample of 102 countries. My augmented gravity equation conditions on importer and exporter fixed
effects as well as trade costs in order to isolate the effect of similarity from many supply side effects,
such as technology, and from gravity forces, such as trade costs and economic sizes. Moreover, I find
no effect of income similarity on trade in industries containing mostly unprocessed goods, and the
effect is largest in industries including highly differentiated products, such as chemicals or machinery
and transport equipment. The first set of results is very robust, noteworthy to accounting for zeros
in trade data and controlling for similarity of average incomes.
Second, the two novel measures characterizing the overlap area – the average income level and the
width of the overlap – are also positively related to the extensive and intensive margin of trade. The
average income level of the overlap area serves as an additional explanatory variable as it describes
the location of the overlap, whereas the width of the overlap is an alternative measure for income
similarity as it reflects how broad the range of incomes is for which two distributions overlap. I find
that not only the extent to which two income distributions overlap but also at which income levels
the overlap is concentrated matters for trade. Moreover, measuring income similarity with the width
of the overlap implies too that bilateral trade margins increase in similarity of demand patterns.
Third, also both margins of disaggregate bilateral trade flows increase in similarity of income
distributions. I document that both the probability that two countries trade a given product (extensive
margin) and the trade value within a given category (intensive margin) increase in similarity of income
distributions. Moreover, both margins increase in the overlap as well as in the average income level and
the width of the overlap. Disaggregate trade flows are observed at the six digit level of the Harmonized
System (HS). The numerous zeros are taken into account by applying a simplified version of the semi-
parametric selection model of Cosslett (1991). The findings on the disaggregate level are robust,
notably if the analysis is performed on the HS 4, 2, 1-digit level and if it is controlled for similarity
of average incomes. Thus, the findings on aggregate trade margins are reinforced by the results on
disaggregate trade flows. This differs from Hallak (2010) who finds that due to an aggregation bias
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the Linder hypothesis can be supported at the sectoral but not at the aggregate level.
This paper tests the hypothesis that bilateral trade flows increase along both margins in similarity
of demand structures. There are three points to be highlighted about this hypothesis. (i) If individuals
have nonhomothetic preferences the income level reflects the demand pattern of a consumer. There
is considerable evidence that both expenditure shares and the set of goods an individual consumes
vary with income, see e.g. Engel (1857), Jackson (1984), Broda & Romalis (2009), Li (2012).3 Hence,
a country’s income distribution reflects its demand pattern and similarity of income distributions
approximates similarity of demand structures. (ii) The home bias, i.e. a country produces those
goods for which domestic demand is relatively large, can be due to imperfect information of producers
– local producers have a better knowledge of domestic than foreign needs, see Linder (1961) – implying
that proximity to demand serves as a comparative advantage or due to the standard home market effect
in Krugman (1980) which results from increasing returns to scale and trade costs.4 This congruence of
consumption and production patterns implies that countries with similar demand structures produce
similar goods. (iii) Trade emerges because of product differentiation and love for variety.
The combination of (i), (ii) and (iii) implies that the more similar the demand structures of two
countries are, the more similar goods they produce and due to product differentiation such country
pairs have a larger scope for trade. Moreover, as demand patterns become more similar this can imply
that a broader range of goods is purchased in the other country (extensive margin) or that demand for
a certain product sold in the other country increases (intensive margin). In sum, similarity of demand
structures – approximated by similarity of income distributions – raises bilateral trade volumes along
both the extensive and intensive margin.
Note that “solely” considering (i) implies that a country’s income distribution affects its imports,
see e.g. Dalgin et al. (2008). In order to predict that the degree to which two income distributions
are similar affects the respective bilateral trade flow the combination of (i), (ii) and (iii) is needed.
This paper is mainly related to four strands in the literature on international trade. First, there
are a handful of theories predicting a positive association between income similarity and trade. By
imposing that manufactured goods have a high income elasticity of demand in consumption and
are at the same time relatively capital intensive in production5 the seminal article by Markusen
(1986) predicts large trade volumes among capital abundant industrialized countries with similar
demand elasticities in manufactured goods. Foellmi et al. (2010) build a theoretical framework for the
extensive margin. Their model predicts that countries trade a larger set of goods the more similar they
are regarding their per capita endowments.6 The theory in Auer (2010) provides a formal derivation
3That the income elasticity of demand varies across goods is shown, among others, in Hunter & Markusen (1988),
Hunter (1991), Bils & Klenow (1998), Deaton (1975) and Dalgin et al. (2008).
4A home bias in consumption can, for example, also be established through an assumption linking endowments or
technology and income elasticity of demand, see Markusen (2010, 1986), Murphy & Shleifer (1997) or Fieler (2011a).
5This assumption is empirically supported in Caron et al. (2012).
6Kohler (2012) extends this model to a dynamic setting and analyzes the interactions of trade and growth.
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of the Linder hypothesis as it predicts higher trade flows among countries with more similar taste
distributions. Murphy & Shleifer (1997), Hallak (2010) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2011b) hypothesize
that countries with more similar levels of per capita incomes trade more with each other as such country
pairs demand and produce goods of similar quality. Fajgelbaum et al. (2011a) show that not only trade
flows but also foreign direct investment is intensive between similar countries. Second, a number of
studies empirically analyze the relationship between income similarity and bilateral trade. The results
are mixed for studies measuring income similarity with similarity of average incomes, see e.g. Hallak
(2010), Choi (2002), McPherson et al. (2000) or Thursby & Thursby (1987). To my knowledge, there
are only two working papers which analyze the relation between similarity of income distributions
and bilateral trade flows, Martinez-Zarzoso & Vollmer (2010) and Bohman & Nilsson (2007).7 Both
studies provide evidence for a positive relationship. The present paper, however, goes beyond these
studies. I provide a thorough analysis that disentangles the effect of income similarity on trade values
into an effect on the extensive and intensive margin, for both aggregate as well as disaggregate trade
flows. Moreover, my analysis is especially careful along several dimensions, such as computation of
income distributions, identification strategy and the type of goods which are considered (consumer
goods). Third, how the within-country income distribution shapes trade patterns is, among others,
discussed in Mitra & Trindade (2005), Dalgin et al. (2008), Matsuyama (2000), Francois & Kaplan
(1996), Fajgelbaum et al. (2011b) and Fieler (2011b).8 Finally, the theories with heterogeneous firms
and fixed exporting costs, starting with Melitz (2003), have contributed considerably to the initiation
of a literature distinguishing trade along the extensive versus intensive margin.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents how similarity of income distributions is
measured and how national income distributions are computed. Trade margins are defined in section 3.
Section 4 specifies the empirical model. The results are discussed in section 5 and section 6 concludes.
2 Similarity of Income Distributions
In order to approximate the degree to which the demand structure of country c resembles the demand
structure of country n I construct a similarity measure of the income distributions of country c and n.
First, the similarity measures are described conceptually (section 2.1), with a slight abuse of notation.
Thereafter it is outlined how the conceptual measures are operationalized with the data. In section
2.2 I document how I compute a discrete income distribution with decile respectively quintile income
shares and GDP per capita for each country. Finally, how the similarity measures of two discrete
empirical income distributions are calculated is described in section 2.3.
7Choi et al. (2009) also study similarity of income distributions, however in another context. They analyze how
similarity of income distributions and similarity of import price distributions of two multilateral importers are related.
8How per capita income affects trade flows is studied, among others, in Markusen (2010), Fieler (2011a), Simonovska
(2010), Saure´ (2009), Hepenstrick (2010), Bernasconi & Wuergler (2012).
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2.1 Definition of Similarity Measures
Let fa(x) denote the density function of income x of country a ∈ {c, n}, where 0≤ x <∞.9 The overlap
Onc, the main measure of similarity, is defined as the minimum integral of the income distributions of
two countries c and n.
Onc =
∫ ∞
0
min {fc(x), fn(x)} dx, ∈ [0, 1] (1)
Figure 1 depicts the income distributions of country c and n. The gray shaded area represents the
overlap of the two income distributions. The overlap has the following properties. It is bounded
between 0 and 1. It is 0 if two income distributions do not overlap at all, i.e. if the minimum income
of c is larger than the maximum income of n. The overlap is maximized for two countries with identical
income distributions (Onc =
∫∞
0 fa(x)dx = 1, a ∈ {c, n}). The overlap is symmetric, i.e. Onc = Ocn.
Figure 1: Illustration of the Overlap of two Income Distributions, Onc
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I establish an additional measure which characterizes the overlap area. It represents at which
income levels the overlap accrues. Ox¯nc is defined as the average income level of the overlap area.
Ox¯nc =
∫ ∞
0
[
min {fc(x), fn(x)}
Onc
· x
]
dx, ∈ (0,min{xmaxc , xmaxn }) (2)
1 =
∫ ∞
0
min {fc(x), fn(x)}
Onc
dx
xmaxa is the maximum income level of a. The size of the overlap area has no impact on O
x¯
nc as it
is rescaled to 1 in order to calculate the average income level. Only the relative concentration of
9It is assumed that fa(x) has no “gaps” in the sense that there exists no  > 0 such that
R x¨+
x¨− fa(x)dx = 0 andR x˙+
x˙− fa(x)dx > 0 and
R ...x +...
x − fa(x)dx > 0, where x˙+  < x¨−  < x¨+  <
...
x −  and x˙ < x¨ < ...x , for any positive and finite
x˙, x¨ and
...
x . All empirical income distributions fulfill this assumption by construction.
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the overlap area along the income axis matters for Ox¯nc. For two countries with identical income
distributions Ox¯nc is equal to the average income x¯a=
∫∞
0 f(x)axdx, a ∈ {c, n}. Ox¯nc varies among
country pairs with identical income distributions as the overlap may occur at different income levels.
In contrast, for such country pairs there is no variation in the overlap Onc as the latter equals 1
whenever the two distributions are identical.
The alternative measure of similarity represents the width of the overlap area. In figure 1 the
income distributions of country c and n overlap for income levels between x1 and x2. The width of
the overlap area Ownc is defined as the distance between these two income levels.
Ownc = x2 − x1, ∈ (0,min{xmaxc , xmaxn }] (3)
x1 ≥ 0, x2 > x1, x1 and x2 are such that
min {fc(x), fn(x)} =

0 for x < x1 and x > x2
> 0 for x1 ≤ x ≤ x2
Ownc is 0 if two income distributions do not overlap at all.
10 For two countries with identical income
distributions Ownc is equal to the difference between the maximum and minimum income level.
The overlap has been used as a measure of similarity of income distributions in the literature
before, see Choi et al. (2009), Bohman & Nilsson (2007) or Martinez-Zarzoso & Vollmer (2010). In
this paper two further similarity measures are proposed, Ox¯nc and O
w
nc.
2.2 Computation of Income Distributions
I use income shares of deciles and quintiles reported in the World Income Inequality Database
(WIID2c), UNU-WIDER (2008b), and GDP per capita from Heston et al. (2009) to compute a discrete
empirical income distribution for each country and year. sda (s
q
a) denotes the share of total income
in country a which is earned by decile d (quintile q), where d ∈ {1, . . . , 10} and q ∈ {1, . . . , 5}. As
inequality changes slowly over time I choose for each country the observation with the highest data
quality within a certain time span – for example between 1992 and 2002 – and use this observation
for the whole period, see the data appendix for details.
The first step of the transformation of the inequality data (sda, s
q
a) into income distributions is the
assignment of an average income level to each decile respectively quintile.
xdat =
sda ·GDPat
POPat/10
, xqat =
sqa ·GDPat
POPat/5
The numerator of the first expression equals total income earned by decile d and the denominator
amounts to the number of individuals belonging to decile d. Thus, xdat is the average income of an
10For simplicity, the condition pinning down the thresholds x1 and x2 is formulated such that O
w
nc is strictly positive.
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individual belonging to decile d in country a and year t. Total income is approximated by real PPP
GDP (in I$ and 2005 constant prices), denoted by GDPat. POPat indicates the population.
As each xdat represents a 10
th of the population it has the area of 0.1 in the probability mass
function of the discrete empirical income distribution. In the second step of the transformation of
the inequality data into income distributions the area of 0.1 of each xdat – which is collapsed at the
value of the average income of decile d – is redistributed on an income interval. Thereby I make only
few assumptions, and importantly no parametric assumption about the functional form of the income
distribution. The assumptions are, (i) the area of 0.1 of xdat is redistributed on the interval [x
d
at
, x
d
at],
xd
at
=

xdat − (xdat − xd−1at )/2 if d > 1
xminat if d = 1
, x
d
at =

xdat + (x
d+1
at − xdat)/2 if d < 10
xmaxat if d = 10
(ii) the redistribution described in assumption (i) occurs uniformly over the income interval [xd
at
, x
d
at]
11,
(iii) xminat = 1 ∀ a, ∀ t, (iv) xmaxat = x10at + 2.7(x10at − x9at). I estimated the relationship in assumption
(iv) using the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) which contains individual data on income for a small
number of countries.12 13
In order to facilitate the calculation of similarity measures of two discrete income distributions,
the densities are partitioned into common intervals with a length of 5’000, where income goes from
1 to 150’000 (in I$ and 2005 constant prices), for all countries. After this final step a discrete em-
pirical income distribution has been computed for each country a and year t. Figure 2 shows as
an example Canada’s income distribution for 2002, see figure A1 for further countries. The dis-
crete income distributions have a slightly different notation. x˘ denotes the income interval, x˘ ∈
{[1 − 5′000], . . . , [145′001 − 150′000]}. fa(x˘) is the density of country a’s income distribution which
accrues at income interval x˘. For instance, fCAN ([1 − 5′000]) = 0.04.14 By definition the densities
sum to 1,
∑
x˘ fa(x˘) = 1, i.e. the area below the line in figure 2 is equal to 1.
Although income shares (sda, s
q
a) are constant within a time span average income levels of deciles
respectively quintiles (xdat, x
q
at), and hence income distributions, change yearly. However, as will be
outlined in section 4, the effect of similarity on trade is identified with variation across exporters and
variation across importers. Hence, I do not rely on variation of the similarity measures over time.
In figure A2 it is shown for Canada that the income distribution computed with WIID – which
only has information for deciles – is not too different from the income distribution computed with LIS
– which has information for each percentile.
11The uniform redistribution is a parametric assumption about the functional form of the income distribution within
deciles. There is no parametric assumption about the functional form of the entire income distribution, i.e. across deciles.
12I approximate xmaxat by the 100th percentile and find that on average (x
max
at − x10at)/(x10at − x9at) is equal to 2.7.
13For quintiles, the area of 0.2 of each xqat is redistributed analogously on [x
q
at
, x
q
at]. (iv) is x
max
at = x
5
at+ 3.8(x
5
at−x4at).
14In the graphs, the width of the intervals is 1 such that the area below the line of an interval x˘ is equal to fa(x˘).
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Figure 2: A Discrete Empirical Income Distribution for Canada
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The time span of income shares sdCAN is 1992−2002 and t=2002 for average income levels xdCAN,t.
2.3 Calculation of Similarity Measures
Equation (1), which is based on continuous income distributions, is adapted such that it yields the
overlap of two discrete income distributions.15
Onc =
∑
x˘
min {fc(x˘), fn(x˘)} , ∈ [0, 1] (4)
Figure 3 illustrates how the overlap for Japan and Canada is measured empirically. The additional
measure taking into account at which income levels the overlap is concentrated and the alternative
measure representing the width of the overlap area are calculated as follows with discrete income
distributions.
Ox¯nc =
∑
x˘
[
min {fc(x˘), fn(x˘)}
Onc
· ˘˘x(x˘)
]
, ∈ [2′500, 147′500],
∑
x˘
min {fc(x˘), fn(x˘)}
Onc
= 1 (5)
Ownc =
∑
x˘
1 (min {fc(x˘), fn(x˘)} > 0) · 5′000, ∈ [5′000, 150′000] (6)
˘˘x(x˘) designates the middle income level of income interval x˘, ˘˘x ∈ {2′500, . . . , 147′500}.
For illustration, table 1 lists all three measures for the country pairs Japan-Canada and Japan-
Mexico. As the income distributions of Japan and Canada are very alike (see figure 3) the overlap
is as high as 0.83. In contrast, incomes in Mexico are much more concentrated at low income levels,
which leads to an overlap with Japan of only 0.36, see figure A3. In the whole sample, the overlap
effectively goes from almost 0 to 1, with mean 0.49 and standard deviation 0.29 (see figure A4 and
15I could use a Kernel smoothing procedure in order to transform the discrete income distributions into continuous
income distributions, however, I believe that this would suggest an exaggerated precision for income distributions which
are based on 10, or even 5, data points (x1at, . . . , x
10
at), respectively (x
1
at, . . . , x
5
at).
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Figure 3: Illustration of the Overlap of two Discrete Empirical Income Distributions, Onc
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The time span of income shares sda is 1992−2002 and t=2002 for average income levels xdat.
table A2). Japan’s and Canada’s income distributions overlap for a wide range of income levels,
OwCAN,JPN=125’000. As incomes in Mexico are rather dispersed also the overlap of Japan and Mexico
accrues over a wide range of incomes, namely from 1 up to 115’000. Thus, while the overlap of Japan-
Canada is more than twice as large than the overlap of Japan-Mexico, the overlap region of these two
country pairs occurs at a similar income range. In addition, the relative concentration of the overlap
area is not too different such that the average income of the overlap area for Japan-Canada is only
slightly higher than for Japan-Mexico. In the entire sample, the average income level of the overlap
area Ox¯nc ranges from 2’500 up to 45’000. The mean is 12’300 and the standard deviation 9’100. The
width of the overlap area Ownc covers the entire range of values from 5’000 to 150’000, with mean
48’700 and standard deviation 36’300. Remember that all similarity measures are symmetric.
Table 1: Illustrating the Similarity Measures with an Example
CAN MEX
JPN
Onc 0.829 0.363
Ox¯nc 30’875 28’649
Ownc 125’000 115’000
year=2002
Note the following difference between the overlap Onc and the average income level of the overlap
area Ox¯nc. While the overlap is typically large for North-North and South-South country pairs the
average income level of the overlap area is much higher for North-North country pairs than for South-
South country pairs, see table A4. For illustration, the overlap for Japan-Canada as well as for
Somalia-Guinea is around 0.83. In contrast, the average income level of the overlap area of Japan and
10
Canada is 30’900 while it amounts to less than a tenth for Somalia and Guinea (2’500). The same
discrepancy is present between the overlap Onc and the width of the overlap area Ownc. For instance,
Somalia-Guinea overlap only over a small income range (5’000) and Japan-Canada almost over the
entire range of incomes (125’000). Consequently, the correlation between the overlap and the two
alternative measures is low, whereas the two alternative measures are highly correlated.16
Most previous studies approximate similarity of demand patterns with similarity of average income
levels. However, using the average income as a first order approximation of the income distribution
neglects important information. About one third of the variation in the overlap cannot be explained
by the variation in the GDP per capita ratio. There is substantial variation in similarity of income
distributions for a given similarity in average income levels. The overlap ranges, for example, from
0.28 up to 0.97 for a GDP per capita ratio of 0.50, see gray bar in figure 4. In the same figure it is
illustrated that similarity in average incomes approximates similarity in income distributions much
better for North-North and North-South country pairs than for South-South country pairs.
Figure 4: Similarity of Income Distributions versus Similarity of Average Incomes
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High income countries, as classified by the World Bank, belong to the North, see table A3.
3 Trade Margins
3.1 Trade Data
The margins of international trade flows are computed with the database of Gaulier & Zignago (2010)
which reports annual bilateral trade flows at the six digit level of the Harmonized System (HS),
version 1992, from 1995 until 2007. The original data has been collected by UN Comtrade. If both the
importer and the exporter report to Comtrade two, possibly different, figures show up for the same
16corr(Onc, O
x¯
nc)=-0.14, corr(Onc, O
w
nc)=0.18, corr(O
x¯
nc, O
w
nc)=0.89
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trade flow. I use the dataset of Gaulier & Zignago (2010) because they reconciled double observations
into a single harmonized value per trade flow.17 The unit of observation in the data is: importer (c),
exporter (n), HS 6-digit code (i), year (t).18 At this level of disaggregation 5’018 product categories
are observed. However, only categories which include consumer goods are used as the rationale for
my hypothesis is driven by the demand side. The corresponding classification is taken from CEPII
which in turn is based on the classification of Broad Economic Categories.19 1’263 product categories
include consumer goods, they correspond to 27% of worldwide value of trade, in 2002. Examples
are cars with large cylinder capacity, microwave ovens or cashew nuts (fresh or dried), see table A1
for more examples. I screen the data as follows: (i) I discard observations which involve countries
from which I do not have information on income distribution, (ii) in order to avoid that very small
countries dominate the sample I drop countries with a population smaller than one million, (iii) I
discard observations of less than US$2’000 as small trade flows are more prone to measurement error.
The sample I use accounts for 94% of the value of worldwide trade in consumer goods. It covers 102
countries at all stages of development – 33 poor, 42 middle income and 27 rich nations, see table A3.
3.2 Bilateral Trade Margins
I study both aggregate and disaggregate bilateral trade flows. Aggregate trade margins, Ync, describe
the flow from exporter n to importer c in all product categories. One observation reveals, for example,
that Japan imports consumer goods from Canada worth 1.24 billion US$ – all examples refer to 2002.
As trade flows differ considerably across product categories I additionally study disaggregate trade
flows, Ynci, i.e. flows from exporter n to importer c in a specific category i. It is for example recorded
that Japan imports cars (with large cylinder capacity, HS 870324) from Canada worth 69 million US$.
Disaggregate Bilateral Trade Margins, Ynci
The data contains information on country c’s imports from exporter n in product category i. For each
trade flow the corresponding value vnci, in thousands of US dollars, is observed. The extensive margin
of disaggregate bilateral trade flows EMnci is an indicator which equals one if c has positive imports
from source country n in product category i and zero otherwise.
EMnci =

1 if vnci > 0
0 if vnci = 0
(7)
17They reconcile double observations into a single figure by weighting the values by the reliability of the two reporting
countries, where the measure for reliability is based on a variance analysis. Another advantage of this database is that all
values are converted to a Free on Board (FOB) basis. Originally imports are reported inclusive of the Cost for Insurance
and Freight (CIF) and exports FOB. The authors estimated transport and insurance rates in order to transform CIF
values into FOB values.
18In the text below, the terms “HS 6-digit” and “HS6” are used interchangeably.
19http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci/non restrict/sector.asp
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At the disaggregate level there is no difference between the intensive margin and the value as the
latter describes trade in a given product category i. The intensive margin of a disaggregate bilateral
trade flow IMnci is defined as the value of the respective flow.20
IMnci = vnci (8)
Aggregate Bilateral Trade Margins, Ync
By summing over product categories aggregate bilateral trade margins are constructed. The value
of the overall trade flow from n to c is decomposed into an extensive and intensive margin. Where
the extensive margin reflects in how many categories two countries engage in trade, i.e. the diversity
of the trade flow, the intensive margin describes how much is traded in the average product. The
decomposition of trade values into the two margins is along the lines of Hummels & Klenow (2005).
The value of country c’s imports from exporter n is normalized by c’s imports from the rest of
the world r. To give an example, Japan’s imports from Canada (1.24 billion US$) are normalized by
Japan’s imports from the rest of the world (83.3 billion US$).
Vnc =
∑
i∈I vnci∑
i∈I vrci
, vrci =
∑
nˆ∈N−n
vnˆci (9)
The rest of the world r denotes all countries from which c imports other than n, N designates the set
of all exporters and I denotes the set of all product categories containing consumer goods.
The extensive margin EMnc is a weighted count of the product categories which c imports from n
relative to the categories which c imports from the rest of the world r. Each category i is weighted by
c’s imports from the rest of the world r, vrci, to prevent that categories which c predominantly imports
from n appear important. As Japan imports only few motorcycles i=871130 has a small weight and
as Japan imports a lot of cars i=870324 has a large weight. Japan imports in 671 categories from
Canada and in 1’249 product categories from the rest of the world r. If all 1’249 categories were of equal
importance, EMCAN,JPN would be equal to 671/1’249=0.54. Yet, as those 671 categories imported
from Canada are important for Japan as an importer EMCAN,JPN is higher than 0.54, namely 0.85.
EMnc =
∑
i∈Inc vrci∑
i∈Irc vrci
(10)
Inc (Irc) designates the set of categories in which c has positive imports from n (rest of the world r).
The intensive margin IMnc compares the value of c’s imports from n to the value of c’s imports
from r in a common set of goods, Inc. Japan’s imports from Canada (1.24 bn US$) are normalized by
20For illustration, while Japan does import motorcycles (with middle cylinder capacity, HS 871130) from Canada it
does not from Mexico (EMCAN,JPN,871130 = 1, EMMEX,JPN,871130 = 0). Japan imports cars (HS 870324) from Canada
for 69 million US$ and from Mexico for only 7 million US$ (IMCAN,JPN,870324 = 69, IMMEX,JPN,870324 = 7).
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Japan’s imports from the rest of the world in the before mentioned 671 categories (72.6 billion US$).
IMnc =
∑
i∈Inc vnci∑
i∈Inc vrci
(11)
The normalized import value is equal to the product of the extensive and intensive margin.
Vnc = EMnc · IMnc
Alternatively, unnormalized aggregate bilateral trade margins, Y˜nc, are defined as simply and
intuitively as possible. V˜nc denotes the value of c’s overall imports from n. E˜Mnc is defined as the
number of product categories in which c has positive imports from source country n. I˜Mnc reflects
the average value per product category.21 See table A2 for summary statistics of all trade margins.
V˜nc =
∑
i∈Inc
vnci, E˜Mnc =
∑
i∈Inc
EMnci, I˜Mnc =
∑
i∈Inc vnci∑
i∈Inc EMnci
, V˜nc = E˜Mnc · I˜Mnc (12)
4 Empirical Model
I test the hypothesis that countries with more similar demand structures trade more with each other.
The prediction is that they trade more in terms of value and along both the extensive and intensive
margin. Similarity of demand structures is approximated by similarity of income distributions. I
use a cross section of the data to test this hypothesis with an augmented gravity equation, both for
aggregate and disaggregate trade flows.
Aggregate Trade Flows, Ync
Equation (13) is the main specification which is estimated with OLS.
ln(Ync) = α+ βOnc + τ ′ncγ +Ac +An + nc, Y ∈ {V,EM, IM} (13)
Ync represents the aggregate bilateral trade flow from exporter n to importer c. Each trade margin is
regressed on the similarity measure Onc which reflects how much the income distributions of trading
partners c and n are alike. The coefficient of interest is βˆ, the marginal effect of similarity of income
distributions on bilateral trade. This effect is conditional on trade costs τnc and importer as well as
exporter fixed effects, Ac and An.
The vector which approximates bilateral trade costs τnc includes the standard controls – geographic
21The importer fixed effects in the regressions absorb, among other things, c’s overall imports as well as the overall
number of categories imported by c. I.e. eYnc are equivalent to import shares, e.g. eVnc/(Pn∈NPi∈I vnci).
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distance, dummies for free trade agreement, currency union, common border, common legal system,
common language and colonial ties.22 In addition, τnc includes a dummy variable which allows for
a different intercept for North-North, South-South and North-South trade flows. This is due to two
reasons. First, the distribution of the extensive margin is tremendously different for North-North trade
flows compared to South-South or North-South trade flows, see table A5. Second, the distribution
of income similarity differs strongly for the three types of trade flows, also when it is conditioned on
the other proxies for bilateral trade costs and importer and exporter fixed effects, see table A4. To
allow for different intercepts captures these disparities partly. A country belongs to the North if it is
classified as a high income country by the World Bank and to the South otherwise, see table A3.23
Importer fixed effects Ac control for all factors which are specific to importer c, such as importer
GDP, importer population, importer production possibilities, importer technology or skills in country
c. Likewise exporter fixed effects An control for all factors which are specific to exporter n, such as
exporter GDP and population, exporter production possibilities, technology and skills. Hence, the
marginal effect of similarity on trade is identified by variation across exporters, for a given importer,
and by variation across importers, for a given exporter. Table A3 documents that also within countries
the similarity measures vary a lot. For instance, Japan’s overlap of its income distribution with the
income distribution of its trading partner (On,JPN ) ranges from 0.05 (n=SOM) up to 0.88 (n=GER).
Regression equation (13) is closely related to a gravity equation. The gravity model predicts that
bilateral trade increases in economic size of the trading partners and diminishes in their distance.
The economic sizes are captured by the importer and exporter fixed effects, whereas τnc absorbs
several dimensions of distance, such as geography or language. Thus, the present specification isolates
the effect of similarity from standard gravity forces. Moreover, the effect of similarity is not only
separated from the effect of economic sizes but also from all other factors which are specific to an
importer respectively exporter, such as technology or skills.
Although all three similarity measures are symmetric one-way trade flows are analyzed. The ex-
planatory variable Onc is the same for Japan’s imports from Canada as for Canada’s imports from
Japan. However, the importer and exporter fixed effects are different for the two trade flows. They
allow a differential import and export behavior of a given country.
It is well known that a substantial fraction of trade flows is zero. In 2002, I have data for 102
countries, hence there are potentially 10’302 one-way trade flows. Thereof 74% are positive, 25% are
zero and for 1% of the trade flows the data is missing. With a bulk of zeros there is potentially
a selection problem, i.e. country pairs which do engage in trade may not be representative for all
22I use the dataset of Helpman et al. (2008) which is available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/helpman/pages/data-1.
23Due to conditioning on importer and exporter fixed effects, which control for whether an importer respectively
exporter belongs to the North, only one of the four combinations of North and South is included in equation (13), and
one serves as the base group. For the coefficient of interest it does not matter which of the four combinations is included.
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country pairs. In order to control for this I apply a simplified version of the semi-parametric analogue
of Heckman’s two-step estimator which is proposed in Cosslett (1991).24 Equation (14) is the first
stage and specifies a linear probability model which is estimated with OLS. 1(Vnc > 0) designates
an indicator which is equal to 1 if imports of c from n are positive and 0 if c does not import from
n. The resulting predicted probabilities w′ncθˆ are ranked and assigned into J bins with equal number
of observations. The bins are denoted with Ij . They approximate the selection correction function
with a step function, hence nonparametrically and in a very flexible way. (15) is the second stage
and nests my baseline specification (13) as it additionally controls for selection with a set of indicator
variables representing the J bins – 1(w′ncθˆ ∈ Ij), where j = 1, . . . , J . In other words, compared to the
baseline specification (15) additionally controls for the probability of a positive trade flow by allowing
bin-specific intercepts. Note that the coefficients on the bins, the λˆj ’s, shed light on the selection
pattern. For instance, if λˆj ’s is increasing in j trade flows with a higher probability of being positive
have systematically higher trade margins (Ync). I choose J=100, i.e. I allow a different intercept for
each percentile of the predicted probabilities (w′ncθˆ). Yet, the results are similar for J=50 or J=200.
1(Vnc > 0) = α+ βOnc + τ ′ncγ + µznc +Ac +An + unc ≡ w′ncθ + unc (14)
ln (Ync) = α+ βOnc + τ ′ncγ +
J∑
j=1
λj · 1(w′ncθˆ ∈ Ij) +Ac +An + nc (15)
znc is the exclusion restriction. The constellation of religious affiliation is assumed to affect whether
c imports from country n but not how much c imports from n or how diverse c’s imports from n are.
This common religion variable is taken from Helpman et al. (2008), they use it for the same type of
exclusion restriction.25
Disaggregate Trade Flows, Ynci
As the drivers for trade may differ across goods also disaggregate trade flows are analyzed.
EMnci = α+ βOnc + τ ′ncγ +Ac +An +Ai + nci (16)
ln(IMnci) = α+ βOnc + τ ′ncγ +Ac +An +Ai + nci (17)
The extensive margin on the disaggregate level is a binary variable, EMnci ∈ {0, 1}. Its relation
to similarity and controls is specified as a linear probability model in equation (16). Also at the
24The procedure in Cosslett (1991) is as follows. The binary response model, the first stage, is estimated with the
nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator in Cosslett (1983). The estimator Fˆ (·) of the marginal cumulative density
function of the selection error is a step function, it is constant on a finite number of intervals, J . In the second stage the
selection correction function is approximated by a piecewise constant function on those intervals. As the second stage is
linear it can be estimated with OLS. Cosslett (1991) shows that the estimator of the first and second stage are consistent.
25religionnc = (% Protestants in country n · % Protestants in country c) + (% Catholics in country n · % Catholics
in country c) + (% Muslims in country n · % Muslims in country c), ∈ [0,1].
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disaggregate level I regress the margins of bilateral trade on the similarity measure Onc which indicates
to which degree the income distributions of c and n are alike. The effect of similarity on trade from n
to c in product category i is conditional on bilateral trade costs τnc as well as importer, exporter and
product category fixed effects, Ac, An and Ai.
With category fixed effects Ai the marginal effects are identified with variation within product
categories. The category fixed effects capture all product specific characteristics, for example how
difficult it is to transport good i around the world (strawberries versus books), the technology needed
to produce the good or the average value of worldwide trade in i. For instance, for cars (HS 870324)
the average bilateral trade value, worldwide, is 47.8 million US$ and for curry (HS 091050) 71’260 US$ .
At the HS 6-digit level 92% of bilateral trade flows are zero in my sample with 102 countries, in
2002. This poses no problem for estimating the linear probability model for the extensive margin
specified in (16) with OLS. However, equation (17) can only be estimated for those 8% of all potential
trade flows which are positive. This is taken into account by applying the simplified version of the semi-
parametric selection model proposed in Cosslett (1991). The first stage is the linear probability model
(16). The predicted probabilities of a positive bilateral disaggregate trade flow, w′nciθˆ, are ranked and
assigned into J bins with equal number of observations. The J bins, denoted with Ij , approximate
the selection correction function with a step function, i.e. nonparametrically. The second stage (18)
includes all regressors of equation (17) and additionally embeds the selection correction function.
ln(IMnci) = α+ βOnc + τ ′ncγ +
J∑
j=1
λj · 1(w′nciθˆ ∈ Ij) +Ac +An +Ai + nci (18)
As religious affiliation is not positively related to c’s probability of importing good i from exporter n
it cannot be used as an exclusion restriction. Due to lack of a plausible exclusion restriction on the
level of products the system is estimated without an exclusion restriction. However, the identification
of β does not stem from a specific functional form of the selection function – as would for example be
the case with the Heckman two-step estimator – as the selection function is nonparametric.
5 Discussion of Results
The three main findings of the empirical analysis provide comprehensive and consistent evidence that
similarity of demand patterns – approximated by similarity of income distributions – is an important
determinant of bilateral trade margins. First, the more the income distributions of two countries
overlap, the higher is their bilateral trade volume in consumer goods. This effect is driven by both
the extensive and intensive margin (section 5.1). In the main specification 63% of the effect of income
similarity on trade values is due to a higher extensive margin, and the remaining 37% due to a higher
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intensive margin, of countries with more similar income distributions. My augmented gravity equation
conditions on importer and exporter fixed effects as well as trade costs in order to isolate the effect of
similarity from supply side effects, such as technology, and from gravity forces, such as trade costs and
economic sizes. Second, the two novel measures characterizing the overlap area – the average income
level and the width of the overlap – are also positively related to both trade margins (section 5.1). The
average income level of the overlap area serves as an additional explanatory variable as it describes
the location of the overlap, whereas the width of the overlap area is an alternative measure for income
similarity as it reflects how broad the range of incomes is for which two distributions overlap. Third,
also the margins of disaggregate trade flows – i.e. trade within product categories – increase in income
distribution similarity (section 5.2). Thus, the findings on the aggregate level are reinforced by the
results on disaggregate trade flows.
5.1 Income Similarity and Aggregate Bilateral Trade Margins (Ync)
Table 2 reports the OLS coefficients from regression equation (13), based on data of 2002. In column
one to three the main measure of similarity is used. On average, countries with a higher overlap of
their income distributions have higher bilateral trade values (Vnc), trade a larger variety of goods
(EMnc) and have higher bilateral trade values in a given set of goods (IMnc).
The first column implies that if the overlap of two income distributions, Onc, increases by one
standard deviation (0.29) the value of bilateral trade in consumer goods increases by 35%. Respec-
tively, the log value is raised by 0.11 standard deviations (beta coefficient). This effect is hence both
statistically as well as economically highly significant.26 Remember, the marginal effect of the overlap
on trade is conditional on importer and exporter fixed effects as well as on trade costs, in order to
isolate the effect of income similarity from supply side effects and gravity forces.
Decomposing bilateral trade values into the two margins demonstrates that the positive association
between the overlap and trade volumes is driven by both the extensive and intensive margin. As
Vnc = EMncIMnc and as the dependent variables are in logarithms the OLS coefficients of the two
margins add up to the coefficient of trade values. On average, countries with a one standard deviation
higher overlap trade a 22% more diversified bundle of goods (extensive margin) and trade 13% more
within a given set of goods (intensive margin). 63% (0.755/1.204) of the effect of a larger overlap
on higher trade values is due to a higher extensive margin of countries with more similar income
distributions. And 37% of the effect are attributed to the intensive margin. With a beta coefficient of
0.1 for the extensive and 0.06 for the intensive margin the effects are not only of statistical but also
of economic importance.
26The overlap ranges from 0 to 1, with mean 0.49 and standard deviation 0.29. For illustration, while Japan’s overlap
with Hungary amounts to 0.47 – which is about the mean of Onc – it is 0.78 with Hong Kong. I.e. the overlap with
Hong Kong is 0.31, or about one standard deviation, higher than the overlap with Hungary.
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Table 2: Ync – Main Specification
ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc) ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc) ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc)
Mean -7.171 -2.639 -4.532 -7.171 -2.639 -4.532 -7.171 -2.639 -4.532
St. dev. 3.106 2.276 2.026 3.106 2.276 2.026 3.106 2.276 2.026
Onc 1.204
??? 0.755??? 0.449??? 0.838??? 0.518??? 0.320??
(0.138) (0.138) (0.128) (0.142) (0.144) (0.136)
Ox¯nc 0.392
??? 0.254??? 0.138???
(0.050) (0.049) (0.046)
Ownc 0.114
??? 0.065??? 0.048???
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
# obs. 7,630 7,630 7,630 7,630 7,630 7,630 7,630 7,630 7,630
# regr. 212 212 212 213 213 213 212 212 212
Adj. R2 0.767 0.601 0.507 0.769 0.602 0.508 0.767 0.601 0.508
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered
by country pairs) are given in parentheses. Controls: geographic distance, dummies for free trade agreement, currency union,
common border, common legal system, common language, colonial ties, dummy variable allowing for a different intercept for
NN, SS, NS and SN trade flows (τnc), importer and exporter fixed effects (Ac and An). Sample: countries with population
> 1 million, HS6 codes which include consumer goods. Year=2002. Income distributions are calculated with quintile and
decile data from 1992 until 2002. This table reports the estimation results from equation (13). The dependent variables are
defined in equations (9)-(11). The income similarity measures are defined in equations (4)-(6).
In column four to six it is shown that not only the extent to which two income distributions overlap
but also at which income levels the overlap is concentrated matters for trade. Additionally controlling
for the average income level of the overlap area, Ox¯nc, somewhat reduces the marginal effects of the
overlap, however, without altering their statistical or economical significance. But importantly, the
value and both the extensive and intensive margin of bilateral trade flows are larger for country pairs
which income distributions overlap at higher income levels, conditional on the size of the overlap.27
Quantitatively, for a given size of the overlap, the bilateral trade value is 36% higher for a country pair
with a one standard deviation higher average income of the overlap area (9’100). Almost two thirds
of this effect is due to a higher extensive margin and one third is due to a higher intensive margin.
The width of the overlap area, Ownc, is used as an alternative measure for income similarity as it
represents the range of incomes for which two distributions overlap and hence captures, in a simple
way, how similar two income distributions are. The last three columns of table 2 document that the
results are qualitatively the same when I use this alternative measure for income similarity.28 An
increase of one standard deviation in the width of the overlap (36’300) is, on average, associated with
a 41% higher trade value. Again, the increase in the value is due to both a larger extensive (24%) and
a larger intensive margin (17%).
Note that the vector τnc, which approximates bilateral trade costs, is omitted in all tables. All
coefficients have the expected sign and are significantly different from zero. Standard errors are clus-
27Ox¯nc ranges from 2’500 to 45’050, with a standard deviation of 9’100. For illustration, while the area of Japan’s
overlap with both Mexico and Poland is 0.36 the average income level of the overlap area with Mexico is 9’000 larger
than with Poland (28’600 versus 19’700).
28Ownc goes from 5’000 to 150’000, with mean 48’700 and standard deviation 36’300. For illustration, the width of
the overlap of Japan-Bulgaria is 45’000. As the distribution of the Dominican Republic is more skewed it overlaps with
Japan up to incomes of 80’000, which is about one standard deviation more than the width of Japan-Bulgaria.
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tered by two-way country pairs, i.e. nc and cn are allowed to be correlated. This might be the case
if there is a country pair specific shock, such as a bilateral political dispute, which lowers country c’s
imports from n as well as country n’s imports from c.29
Before I address the zeros in trade data, I outline in this paragraph that the above findings are very
robust. Table 3 displays that the results are qualitatively the same for unnormalized trade margins
which are computed in a simple and intuitive way. A country imports more from source countries
with a higher overlap, not only in terms of value but also along both margins.30 Moreover, for a given
overlap of income distributions, the higher the average income level of the overlap area, the larger are
bilateral trade margins. Last, the broader the range of incomes for which two income distributions
overlap, the larger is the bilateral trade value. Also this effect is driven by both margins.
Table 3: Y˜nc – Main Specification with Unnormalized Trade Margins
ln(eVnc) ln(gEMnc) ln(gIMnc) ln(eVnc) ln(gEMnc) ln(gIMnc) ln(eVnc) ln(gEMnc) ln(gIMnc)
Mean 7.792 3.301 4.491 7.792 3.301 4.491 7.792 3.301 4.491
St. dev. 3.384 2.040 1.700 3.384 2.040 1.700 3.384 2.040 1.700
Onc 1.216
??? 0.646??? 0.570??? 0.848??? 0.502??? 0.346???
(0.137) (0.079) (0.095) (0.141) (0.083) (0.099)
Ox¯nc 0.392
??? 0.153??? 0.238???
(0.050) (0.029) (0.035)
Ownc 0.115
??? 0.047??? 0.068???
(0.012) (0.007) (0.008)
# obs. 7,656 7,656 7,656 7,656 7,656 7,656 7,656 7,656 7,656
# regr. 212 212 212 213 213 213 212 212 212
Adj. R2 0.804 0.837 0.574 0.806 0.838 0.576 0.804 0.836 0.576
Notes: The same notes apply as in table 2. The only difference is that the dependent variables are defined in equation (12).
In order to show that the identified effect really captures similarity of income distributions, and not
similarity of average incomes, I additionally control for the ratio of per capita incomes. Qualitatively
this does not change the results, see table A6. There is one exception, the effect of the overlap on the
extensive margin is not significantly different from zero for normalized trade margins. However, for
unnormalized trade margins also the results about the extensive margin are unchanged.
The above results, which are based on data of 2002, are both qualitatively and quantitatively
representative for the whole period 1995 to 2007. In each and every year, trade values increase signif-
icantly in similarity of income distributions, for all measures of similarity. In all years, this effect is
driven by both the extensive and intensive margin. This is true for normalized as well as unnormalized
29One might be worried that the error terms of an importing country are not independent because of a shock of
the following type. A recession lowers c’s import demand resulting in a slightly negative effect on countries exporting
necessity goods to c and a large negative effect on exporters selling durable goods to c. Although the average effect of
the recession is captured by the importer fixed effect the differential effects on exporters leads to correlated error terms.
To account for this, and analogously correlated errors of an exporting country, I clustered the standard errors both by
importers and exporters. This increases the standard errors, however does not affect the significance levels.
30The marginal effects are quantitatively very similar for normalized and unnormalized trade values as most of the
difference between Vnc and eVnc is captured by the importer fixed effects.
20
trade margins, see table A7 and A8. Moreover, pooling all cross sections and including importer-year
and exporter-year fixed effects yields very similar results to using only one cross section, see table A9.31
Next, it is shown that taking into account the zeros in the estimation procedure does not alter
the main findings. In table 4 I apply the simplified version of the semi-parametric selection model
of Cosslett (1991) described in section 4. The only difference to the baseline are the bin-specific
intercepts which represent the probability that a trade flow is positive and approximate the selection
function non-parametrically. The first panel reports the results for normalized trade margins (Ync).
The value of bilateral trade flows increases significantly in income similarity, Onc, if the zeros are
taken into account. Even the magnitude of the marginal effect is close to the baseline estimation.
Controlling for selection lowers the marginal effect of similarity on the intensive margin and raises
the marginal effect on the extensive margin. The effect on the intensive margin is estimated very
imprecisely. The coefficients on the bin-specific intercepts (λˆj) disclose that trade flows which have a
higher probability to be positive have systematically a lower intensive and higher extensive margin.
Additionally controlling for the average income level of the overlap area again lowers the marginal
effects of the overlap and shows that the extensive and value margin are larger for country pairs whose
overlap is concentrated at higher incomes, Ox¯nc. Controlling for selection does not alter the results
when similarity is measured with the width of the overlap Ownc.
Selection seems to be less of an issue for unnormalized trade margins (Y˜nc), see second panel.
Income similarity has a significantly positive effect on trade values. This effect is driven by both
margins and is qualitatively the same for all measures of similarity. The effects are rather close to
the baseline OLS estimates as there is no clear selection pattern for the intensive margin and as the
extensive margin is only slightly higher for trade flows with a higher probability of being positive.
The number of bins J is 100, yet the results are alike for J=50 or J=200. Moreover, estimates
which do not rely on an exclusion restriction are similar. The first stage indicates that whether two
countries engage in trade depends negatively on similarity. However, the effect is very small and not
even significantly different from zero when additionally controlling for average income of the overlap.
Last, I outline that the patterns described above hold for trade in various industries. Aggregate
bilateral trade margins are computed for each section of the Standard International Trade Classification
(SITC).32 There are three interesting points about table 5. (i) Estimating the augmented gravity
equation (13) for each section of SITC separately unfolds that the overlap of income distributions
31Note that the qualitative results of table 2 and 3 are also unchanged if equation (13) is specified as a log-log instead
of log-lin model or if observations are weighted by the total population of the country pair.
32Trade margins are calculated analogously to equations (9)-(11) for each section of the SITC (SITC 1-digit codes).
For two reasons the SITC rather than the HS classification is used to analyze trade flows in different industries. (i) The
SITC classifies commodities according to their stage of production, whereas the HS nomenclature is based on the nature
of the commodity. (ii) At the 1-digit level there are 10 codes for the SITC and 21 for the HS.
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is significantly positively associated with bilateral trade values for all SITC sections except crude
materials, oils & fats and commodities n.e.s. The effects on trade values are driven by both the
extensive and intensive margin. (ii) The effect of income similarity on trade is largest for chemicals,
followed by machinery and transport equipment and manufactured goods. (iii) Estimating a pooled
regression, and controlling for SITC section fixed effects (column one), confirms the qualitative results
for overall trade flows. That there is no effect of income similarity in industries containing mostly
unprocessed goods, and that the effect is largest in industries including highly differentiated products
– such as chemicals or machinery and transport equipment – is in favor of the hypothesis.33
5.2 Income Similarity and Disaggregate Bilateral Trade Margins (Ynci)
In this section it is shown that also the extensive and intensive margin of disaggregate bilateral trade
flows, i.e. trade within product categories, increase in similarity of income distributions. At the
disaggregate level the extensive margin EMnci is an indicator which equals 1 if country c does import
product category i from source country n. The intensive margin IMnci is the value of c’s imports
in product i from exporter n. Within product categories, i.e. at the disaggregate level, there is no
difference between the value and the intensive margin.
Table 6 documents that country c has a significantly higher probability to import a given product
from those source countries which have an alike income distribution. Column one implies that, on
average, an increase of one standard deviation in the overlap Onc (0.29) is associated with a 3.4
percentage point higher probability of bilaterally importing a product. With a beta coefficient of 0.13
this effect is both statistically and economically highly significant. Moreover, the probability to import
a given product from a given exporter does not only increase in the overlap but it is also higher if the
exports stem from source countries with which the overlap is concentrated at higher income levels,
Ox¯nc. For a given size of the overlap, an increase of the average income level of the overlap area of
one standard deviation is associated with a 1.6 percentage point higher probability of a positive trade
flow. Measuring the degree to which two income distributions are alike with the width of the overlap,
Ownc, yields the same implication. An increase of one standard deviation in the width of the overlap
raises the probability of importing a given product from a given exporter by 2.9 percentage point.
For the results on the intensive margin it matters a lot whether selectivity is accounted for. The
OLS model specified in equation (17) implies that there is no, or even a negative, relation between
similarity of income distributions and the bilateral trade value within a product category. However,
controlling for the non-parametric selection function (Cosslett), as described in section 4, changes the
findings completely. Conditioning on the predicted probability that a trade flow is positive (bin specific
intercepts) implies that the value of a country’s imports in a given product is significantly higher when
33For lack of space the corresponding results for unnormalized trade margins and other measures of income similarity
are not reported as they yield qualitatively the same insights.
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Table 6: Ynci – Main Specification
EMnci ln(IMnci) EMnci ln(IMnci) EMnci ln(IMnci)
Mean 0.079 3.841 0.079 3.841 0.079 3.841
St. dev. 0.270 2.187 0.270 2.187 0.270 2.187
OLS Cosslett OLS Cosslett OLS Cosslett
Onc 0.118
??? -0.074 0.296??? 0.099??? 0.009 0.213??
(0.006) (0.090) (0.106) (0.008) (0.091) (0.105)
Ox¯nc 0.018
??? -0.120??? 0.080??
(0.004) (0.034) (0.035)
Ownc 0.008
??? -0.027??? 0.015?
(0.001) (0.007) (0.008)
Selection? No Yes No Yes No Yes
# obs. 12990822 1028150 1028150 12990822 1028150 1028150 12990822 1028150 1028150
# regressors 1475 1474 1574 1476 1475 1575 1475 1474 1574
Adjusted R2 0.310 0.300 0.326 0.311 0.300 0.326 0.308 0.300 0.326
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered
by country pairs) are given in parentheses. Controls: geographic distance, dummies for free trade agreement, currency union,
common border, common legal system, common language, colonial ties, dummy variable allowing for a different intercept for
NN, SS, NS and SN trade flows (τnc), importer, exporter and HS6 code fixed effects (Ac, An and Ai). Sample: countries with
population > 1 million, HS6 codes which include consumer goods. Year=2002. Income distributions are calculated with quintile
and decile data from 1992 until 2002. This table reports the estimation results from equation (16), (17) and (18), where J = 100.
The dependent variables are defined in equation (7) and (8). The income similarity measures are defined in equations (4)-(6).
they stem from source countries which have a more similar income distribution. Quantitatively, a one
standard deviation larger overlap is associated with a 8.5% higher trade value, within a category.
The estimates on the bin-specific intercepts (λˆj) unfold that trade flows with a higher probability of
being positive have systematically and substantially lower trade values. This falling selection pattern
constitutes a downward bias for the OLS estimate in column two. Controlling for selection moreover
unfolds that countries import more from exporters with which their income distribution overlaps at
higher incomes. Also the width of the overlap raises disaggregate trade values significantly. The
number of bins J is 100, yet the results are qualitatively similar for J=50 or J=200.
Bilateral trade costs are omitted in all tables, the coefficients have the same sign as on the aggregate
level. Standard errors are again clustered by two-way country pairs.34
Thus, both aggregate bilateral trade flows as well as bilateral trade flows within a given product
category increase at both margins in similarity of income distributions.
In table 7 the same analysis is shown for higher levels of aggregation. At the 4-digit level EMnci
represents whether or not c does import HS4 code i from n.35 That a country is more likely to import
a given category from source countries with more similar income distributions holds for all levels of
aggregation (HS6, HS4, HS2, HS1) and for both measures of income similarity. Furthermore, for all
levels of aggregation, this probability increases in the average income level of the overlap area.
34Clustering the standard errors by importer, exporter and HS6 codes does not change the significance level for the
extensive margin. However, the coefficients on the intensive margin have a p-value larger than 0.1.
35The HS has four hierarchical levels. The 1-digit level corresponds to sections, the 2-digit level represents chapters,
the 4-digit codes identify headings and the 6-digit codes represent sub-headings.
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Table 7: Ynci – Level of Aggregation
EMnci ln(IMnci) EMnci ln(IMnci) EMnci ln(IMnci)
OLS Cosslett OLS Cosslett OLS Cosslett
HS4 Onc 0.171??? 0.215?? 0.503??? 0.129??? 0.277??? 0.379???
(0.008) (0.091) (0.116) (0.010) (0.094) (0.109)
Ox¯nc 0.039
??? -0.081?? 0.151???
(0.004) (0.034) (0.037)
Ownc 0.013
??? -0.008 0.029???
(0.001) (0.007) (0.009)
HS2 Onc 0.212??? 0.560??? 0.693??? 0.150??? 0.495??? 0.524???
(0.009) (0.090) (0.118) (0.010) (0.093) (0.110)
Ox¯nc 0.058
??? 0.077?? 0.150???
(0.004) (0.033) (0.040)
Ownc 0.018
??? 0.030??? 0.036???
(0.001) (0.007) (0.010)
HS1 Onc 0.226??? 0.867??? 0.442??? 0.165??? 0.683??? 0.446???
(0.011) (0.098) (0.123) (0.012) (0.100) (0.115)
Ox¯nc 0.058
??? 0.209??? 0.013
(0.005) (0.035) (0.041)
Ownc 0.019
??? 0.064??? 0.013
(0.001) (0.008) (0.010)
Notes: The same notes apply as in table 6. The only difference is that here we have HS4, H2 respectively HS1 codes.
Regarding the intensive margin the results are qualitatively the same on all levels of aggregation if
it is conditioned on the selection function – countries import systematically more from exporters with
more similar income distributions, within categories. As mentioned above, the 6-digit OLS results im-
ply no or a negative association between similarity and bilateral trade values. In contrast, on higher
levels of aggregation (HS4, HS2, HS1) the relation is positive. Because of the following two features of
articles of apparel (HS2 codes 61 and 62) the OLS results on the 6-digit level are biased downwards.
(i) Due to the fine customs structure for articles of apparel they are artificially detailed and hence
have disproportionately many HS6 codes within HS4 codes, see also Cadot et al. (2011).36 Recall
that the Harmonized System is not only used for the collection of trade statistics but also serves as a
basis for customs tariffs. (ii) Trade values in apparel are negatively related to similarity. Estimating
equation (17) for each HS4 code separately yields 313 βˆi’s, see table A10. While a HS4 code including
apparel has on average a negative coefficient (-0.79), the average effect of all other HS4 codes is positive
(0.27). In sum, the negative relation of trade in apparel and similarity gets too much weight on the
6-digit level because apparel is artificially detailed due to customs tariffs.37 That the consequential
36Whereas a HS4 code including apparel is on average split into 6.9 HS6 codes, a HS4 code without apparel has on
average only 3.7 HS6 codes. For illustration, “women’s or girls’ suit, dress, skirt, etc, knit or crochet” (6104) is broken
down into 25 HS6 codes, e.g. women’s or girls’ ensembles of wool, knit (610421). In contrast, “Grape wines, alcoholic
grape must” (2204) has only four sub-headings, e.g. sparkling wine (220410).
37Figure A5 illustrates that HS4 codes with a negative coefficient have disproportionately many sub-headings and that
this is driven by articles of apparel.
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downward bias on the HS6 OLS coefficient (pooled regression) is sizeable is demonstrated in table
A11. Estimating (16)-(18) separately for apparel and non-apparel shows that income similarity has
a significantly positive effect on the intensive margin for all products but apparel (1’028 HS6 codes)
and a significantly negative effect for apparel (233 HS6 codes), for both OLS and Cosslett.
The findings on disaggregate trade margins are robust. In table A12 I additionally control for
similarity of average incomes. As this does not change the results the above effects really reflect
similarity in income distributions. The findings above are based on data of 2002. The results on
the extensive margin are extremely robust regarding time. In all years, I find a significantly positive
relationship between similarity in income distributions and the probability of a positive trade flow,
for all measures of similarity, see table A13. Furthermore, pooling all cross sections, and including
importer-year and exporter-year fixed effects, also shows that the results for 2002 are both qualita-
tively and quantitatively representative for the whole period 1995 to 2007, see first panel of table A14.
Regarding the intensive margin, in some years the results are not as supportive as in 2002. In some
years the marginal effect of the overlap on the intensive margin is significantly positive, in some it is
positive but insignificant and in some the estimator is very imprecise. Pooling all cross sections yields
a positive but insignificant effect of the overlap on the intensive margin. However, the alternative
similarity measure, Ownc, is significantly positively related to the intensive margin in all years, and also
if all cross sections are pooled. Moreover, the second to fourth panel of table A14 document that for
the HS 4-, 2- and 1-digit level the year 2002 is representative for the whole period 1995 to 2007.38
After having demonstrated that income similarity raises both the extensive and intensive margin
within product categories, on all levels of disaggregation, I outline that this holds also within various
industries. Equations (16)-(18) are estimated for each section of the SITC separately. I.e. all HS6 codes
belonging to an SITC section are pooled in one regression. Let me highlight two main findings from
table 8. (i) Documenting a positive and highly significant relation between income similarity and the
probability to import a given product from a given exporter for each and every SITC section provides
strong evidence for my hypothesis that more similar demand structures increase trade. Moreover,
the effect is largest for chemicals, machinery and transport equipment and manufacturing goods,
i.e. in industries with highly differentiated products. (ii) The intensive margin of bilateral trade is
significantly higher for country pairs with more similar income distributions in all SITC sections but
crude materials, manufactured goods, miscellaneous manufactured articles, commodities n.e.s. That
trade in crude materials and commodities n.e.s. does not increase in similarity does not challenge
the supportive evidence for the hypothesis. The result of miscellaneous manufactured articles is non-
38Note that the qualitative results of table 6 are unchanged if income similarity is used in logs in equation (16), (17)
and (18) or if observations are weighted by the total population of the country pair.
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confirmative as apparel belongs to this industry. Note that on the 4-digit level the relation between
income similarity and trade in manufactured goods is significantly positive.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates empirically how similarity of demand structures – approximated by similarity
of income distributions – affects trade patterns along the extensive and intensive margin. The idea
that similarity of demand structures intensifies trade has a long tradition in the economic literature,
originally put forth by Linder (1961), and more recently by Markusen (1986) or Foellmi et al. (2010).
The three main findings of this paper provide comprehensive and consistent evidence that similarity
of demand structures is an important determinant of bilateral trade margins. First, the more similar
two countries are regarding their income distributions, the higher is their bilateral trade volume in
consumer goods. This effect is driven by both margins. The magnitudes of the effects are economically
relevant. On average, countries with a one standard deviation higher overlap have a 35% higher trade
value, trade a 22% more diversified bundle of goods (extensive margin) and trade 13% more within a
given set of goods (intensive margin). Second, the two novel measures characterizing the overlap area
are also positively related to both trade margins. I find that not only the extent to which two income
distributions overlap but also at which income levels the overlap is concentrated matters for trade.
Moreover, measuring income similarity with the width of the overlap area implies too that bilateral
trade margins increase in similarity of demand patterns. Third, also both margins of disaggregate
trade flows increase in similarity of income distributions. I document that both the probability that
two countries trade a given product (extensive margin) and the trade value within a given category
(intensive margin) increase in income similarity. Thus, both aggregate as well as disaggregate trade
flows increase along both margins in income distribution similarity.
I make two major contributions. First, I decompose the effect of income similarity on trade values
into an effect on the extensive and intensive margin. Second, in this paper the relationship between
similarity of income distributions – as opposed to similarity of average incomes – and bilateral trade
flows is analyzed. Furthermore, I make two methodological contributions by establishing two novel
measures for similarity of income distributions and by developing a new procedure to compute national
income distributions with income shares and per capita incomes.
The present analysis could be extended in several ways. So far, the quality margin has not been
taken into account. Murphy & Shleifer (1997), Hallak (2010) or Fajgelbaum et al. (2011b) predict
that countries with more similar demand structures trade more with each other as such country pairs
demand and produce goods of similar quality. For the empirical analysis this implies that countries
with more similar income distributions trade more – which has already been shown in this paper
– and that the more similar two countries are, the more similar are the quality levels they trade.
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In addition, these models predict that countries whose income distributions overlap at higher levels
of income trade goods of higher quality. Furthermore, working out a formal model based on non-
homothetic preferences in which consumption and production patterns overlap and trade emerges due
to product differentiation and love for variety would be of interest. In particular, such a model would
shed light on aggregation effects from the product to the aggregate level, and whether such aggregation
effects differ when non-homotheticity is horizontal – i.e. horizontally differentiated goods with varying
income elasticities – instead of vertical as in Hallak (2010).
30
References
Atkinson, A. B. & Brandolini, A. (2001). Promise and Pitfalls in the Use of “Secondary” Data-Sets:
Income Inequality in OECD Countries as a Case Study. Journal of Economic Literature, 39 (3),
771–799.
Auer, R. (2010). Consumer Heterogeneity and the Impact of Trade Liberalization: How Representative
is the Representative Agent Framework?, Swiss National Bank, Working Papers: 2010–13.
Bernasconi, C. & Wuergler, T. (2012). Per Capita Income and the Quality and Variety of Imports,
University of Zurich, Mimeo.
Bils, M. & Klenow, P. (1998). Using Consumer Theory to Test Competing Business Cycle Models.
Journal of Political Economy, 106 (2), 233–261.
Bohman, H. & Nilsson, D. (2007). Market Overlap and the Direction of Exports - A New Approach
of Assessing the Linder Hypothesis, CESIS Working Paper No. 86.
Broda, C. & Romalis, J. (2009). The Welfare Implications of Rising Price Dispersion, University of
Chicago, Mimeo.
Cadot, O., Carre`re, C., & Strauss-Kahn, V. (2011). Export Diversification: What’s Behind the Hump?
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 93 (2), 590–605.
Caron, J., Fally, T., & Markusen, J. R. (2012). Skill Premium and Trade Puzzles: A Solution Linking
Production and Preferences, CEPR Discussion Papers No. 8999.
Choi, C. (2002). Linder Hypothesis Revisited. Applied Economics Letters, 9 (9), 601–605.
Choi, Y. C., Hummels, D., & Xiang, C. (2009). Explaining Import Quality: The Role of the Income
Distribution. Journal of International Economics, 78 (2), 293–303.
Cosslett, S. (1983). Distribution-Free Maximum Likelihood Estimator of the Binary Choice Model.
Econometrica, 51 (3), 765–782.
Cosslett, S. (1991). Distribution-Free Estimator of a Regression Model with Sample Selectivity, in:
W.A. Barnett, J.L. Powell and G. Tauchen, eds., Nonparametric and Semiparametric Methods in
Econometrics and Statistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dalgin, M., Trindade, V., & Mitra, D. (2008). Inequality, Nonhomothetic Preferences, and Trade: A
Gravity Approach. Southern Economic Journal, 74 (3), 747–774.
Deaton, A. (1975). The Measurement of Income and Price Elasticities. European Economic Review,
6 (3), 261–273.
Dollar, D. & Kraay, A. (2002). Growth Is Good for the Poor. Journal of Economic Growth, 7 (3),
195–225.
Engel, E. (1857). Die Productions- und Consumptionsverha¨ltnisse des Ko¨nigreichs Sachsen. Zeitschrift
des Statistischen Bu¨reaus des Ko¨niglich Sa¨chsischen Ministeriums des Inneren, (No. 8 and 9).
Fajgelbaum, P., Grossman, G., & Helpman, E. (2011a). A Linder Hypothesis for Foreign Direct
Investment, NBER Working Paper No. 17550.
Fajgelbaum, P., Grossman, G., & Helpman, E. (2011b). Income Distribution, Product Quality, and
International Trade. Journal of Political Economy, 119 (4), 721–765.
Fieler, A. C. (2011a). Nonhomotheticity and Bilateral Trade: Evidence and a Quantitative Explana-
tion. Econometrica, 79 (4), 1069–1101.
Fieler, A. C. (2011b). Quality Differentiation in International Trade: Theory and Evidence, University
of Pennsylvania, Mimeo.
Foellmi, R., Hepenstrick, C., & Zweimueller, J. (2010). Non-homothetic Preferences, Parallel Imports
and the Extensive Margin of International Trade, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 7939.
Foellmi, R., Oechslin, M., & Zahner, M. (2011). Inequality and Growth: Relying on Quantile Shares,
University of Bern, Mimeo.
Francois, J. & Kaplan, S. (1996). Aggregate Demand Shifts, Income Distribution, and the Linder
Hypothesis. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 78 (2), 244–250.
Gaulier, G. & Zignago, S. (2010). BACI: International Trade Database at the Product-level. The
31
1994-2007 Version, CEPII Working Paper No. 2010–23.
Hallak, J. C. (2010). A Product-Quality View of the Linder Hypothesis. The Review of Economics
and Statistics, 92 (3), 453–466.
Helpman, E., Melitz, M., & Rubinstein, Y. (2008). Estimating Trade Flows: Trading Partners and
Trading Volumes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123 (2), 441–487.
Hepenstrick, C. (2010). Per-Capita Incomes and the Extensive Margin of Bilateral Trade, University
of Zurich, Working Paper Series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 519.
Heston, A., Summers, R., & Aten, B. (2009). Penn World Table Version 6.3, Center for International
Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania.
Hummels, D. & Klenow, P. (2005). The Variety and Quality of a Nation’s Exports. The American
Economic Review, 95 (3), 704–723.
Hunter, L. (1991). The Contribution of Nonhomothetic Preferences to Trade. Journal of International
Economics, 30 (4), 345–358.
Hunter, L. & Markusen, J. (1988). Per Capita Income as a Basis for Trade, in Robert Feenstra,
Empirical Methods for International Trade, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Jackson, L. F. (1984). Hierarchic Demand and the Engel Curve for Variety. The Review of Economics
and Statistics, 66 (1), 8–15.
Kohler, A. (2012). Trade and Growth in an Unequal Global Economy, University of Zurich, Working
Paper Series / Department of Economics No. 81.
Krugman, P. (1980). Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade. The
American Economic Review, 70 (5), 950–59.
Li, N. (2012). An Engel Curve for Variety, University of Toronto, Mimeo.
Linder, S. (1961). An Essay on Trade and Transformation. Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksells.
LIS. Luxembourg Income Study Database, http://www.lisproject.org/techdoc.htm.
Markusen, J. (1986). Explaning the Volume of Trade: An Eclectic Approach. The American Economic
Review, 76 (5), 1002–1011.
Markusen, J. (2010). Putting Per-Capita Income back into Trade Theory, NBER Working Paper No.
15903.
Martinez-Zarzoso, I. & Vollmer, S. (2010). Bilateral Trade Flows and Income-Distribution Similarity,
Working Papers on International Economics and Finance.
Matsuyama, K. (2000). A Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods under Non-homothetic Pref-
erences: Demand Complementarities, Income Distribution, and North-South Trade. Journal of
Political Economy, 108 (6), 1093–1120.
McPherson, M. A., Redfearn, M. R., & Tieslau, M. A. (2000). A Re-Examination of The Linder
Hypothesis: A Random-Effects Tobit Approach. International Economic Journal, 14 (3), 123–136.
Melitz, M. (2003). The Impact of Trade on Intra-industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry
Productivity. Econometrica, 71, 1695–1725.
Mitra, D. & Trindade, V. (2005). Inequality and Trade. The Canadian Journal of Economics, 38 (4),
1253–1271.
Murphy, K. & Shleifer, A. (1997). Quality and Trade. Journal of Development Economics, 53 (1),
1–15.
Saure´, P. (2009). Bounded Love of Variety and Patterns of Trade, Swiss National Bank, Working
Papers: 2009–10.
Simonovska, I. (2010). Income Differences and Prices of Tradables, NBER Working Paper No. 16233.
Thursby, J. & Thursby, M. (1987). Bilateral Trade Flows, the Linder Hypothesis, and Exchange Risk.
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 69 (3), 488–495.
UNU-WIDER (2008a). World Income Inequality Database, User Guide and Data Sources.
UNU-WIDER (2008b). World Income Inequality Database, Version 2.0c, May,
www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en GB/database/.
32
Appendix – Inequality Data
I use the income shares reported in the WIID as it is the only database about within-country inequality
which covers a large number of countries. In the raw data s˜dat (s˜
q
at), the income share earned by decile
d (quintile q) in country a and year t, where d ∈ {1, . . . , 10} (q ∈ {1, . . . , 5}), is observed. There are
mainly two issues to be considered with these data. (i) The underlying surveys differ along several
dimensions, both across countries and over time (for a given country), e.g. income versus expenditure
inequality. (ii) If a country is included in the WIID the corresponding income shares are usually not
observed in every year. In order to create a dataset which is as comparable as possible and which
covers a large number of countries I choose for each country the “best” observation within a given
time span and use this observation for the whole corresponding period. This mitigates both above
mentioned issues. I can choose as consistent surveys as possible (across countries) and increase data
quality by picking the “best” observation out of all available observations within a time span. This
addresses some of the problems of using “secondary” datasets discussed in Atkinson & Brandolini
(2001). Moreover, there are no missing country-year observations, within a time span, by assumption.
The following time spans are defined: 1992-2002, 1997-2007 and 1999-2009. Using an observation
for several years is a minor issue as inequality changes slowly over time. Figure AD1 shows for two
exemplary countries that quintile income shares are fairly stable over a decade.
Figure AD1: Evolution of Quintile Income Shares over Time
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Notes: Japan cannot be used as an example as there is only one observation in the WIID from 1992-2002.
The criteria for selecting the “best” available observation about inequality for each country and
time span are (i) decile shares rather than quintile shares, (ii) income inequality rather than con-
sumption inequality, (iii) net income inequality rather than gross income inequality, (iv) high quality
inequality data rather than low quality inequality data according to 4-level quality rating in WIID2c
which is based on wether the underlying concepts are known and on the quality of the income concept
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and the survey (see UNU-WIDER (2008a)), (v) inequality data with full area, population and age
coverage rather than inequality data with partial area, population and age coverage, (vi) inequality
regarding individuals rather than inequality regarding households and (vii) inequality data adjusted
to person inequality rather than unadjusted inequality data. If more than one observation, per coun-
try and time span, fulfill these criteria likewise I take the arithmetic mean (over time). The “best”
observation for a, selected according to (i)-(vii), is denoted by s˘da respectively s˘
q
a and is used for the
whole time span.39
Choosing as consistent surveys as possible mitigates the problem of comparability across countries
but does not resolve it completely. For example, if there is no survey based on income inequality for a
country in a given time span. In order to account for the well known difference between income and
consumption inequality all expenditure based inequality measures are adjusted as in Foellmi et al.
(2011), which is similar to the adjustment in Dollar & Kraay (2002). s˘d,ba denotes the share of total
income (expenditure) which is earned (spent) by decile d in country a. For b = inc the decile reflects
inequality in income and for b = exp inequality in expenditure. Each expenditure based decile is
multiplied by its adjustment factor Ad which equals the ratio between the sample mean of income
based deciles and the sample mean of expenditure based deciles.40 The scaling factor Sdeca ensures
that the adjusted decile shares sda add up to 1.
sda =

s˘d,ba AdSdeca if b = exp
s˘d,ba if b = inc
, Ad =
1
Nd,inc
∑
a
∑
t s˜
d,inc
at
1
Nd,exp
∑
a
∑
t s˜
d,exp
at
, Sdeca =
1∑
d s˘
d,exp
a Ad
,
∑
d
sda = 1
Expenditure based quintiles are adjusted accordingly. As all inequality measures of rich countries
are income based only observations of middle income and poor countries need to be adjusted. The
adjustment factors are therefore calculated with data of middle income and poor countries only.
After choosing from all available observations (s˜dat) the “best” observation for each country and
time span (s˘da), and where required adjusting it from expenditure to income inequality (s
d
a), I have
income shares for 102 countries for the time span from 1992 to 2002. For 94 countries I have decile
income shares (s1a, . . . , s
10
a ) and for 8 countries quintile income shares (s
1
a, . . . , s
5
a). For the period
1997 to 2007 income shares are available for 91 countries (deciles for 66 and quintiles for 25 countries)
and from 1999 to 2009 for 88 countries (deciles for 55 and quintiles for 33 countries).
One might find it intuitive to think of a Lorenz curve rather than income shares. The Lorenz curve
is a graphical representation of the cumulative distribution function of income. LCda =
∑d
δ=1 s
δ
a is the
share of total income of country a earned by individuals belonging to decile d or lower. Note that
piecewise linear Lorenz curves, as used in this paper, underestimate inequality.
39An observation is composed of all income shares, i.e. (s˘1a, . . . , s˘
10
a ) or (s˘
1
a, . . . , s˘
5
a).
40A1=0.58, A2=0.73, A3=0.79, A4=0.83, A5=0.86, A6=0.90, A7=0.93, A8=0.97, A9=1.02, A10=1.19
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Appendix – Figures
Figure A1: A Discrete Empirical Income Distribution for a Sample of Countries
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Notes: The decile (quintile) income shares sda (s
q
a) are for time span 1992-2002. The average income levels
of deciles (quintiles) xdat (x
q
at) are for t = 2002. This is a random sample of 9 rich, 9 middle income and 9
poor countries.
35
Figure A2: World Income Inequality Database (WIID) versus Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)
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The time span of income shares sdCAN is 1992−2002 and t=2002 for average income levels xdCAN,t.
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Figure A3: Overlap of Japan’s and Mexico’s Income Distributions
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The time span of income shares sda is 1992−2002 and t=2002 for average income levels xdat.
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Figure A4: Histogram of Similarity Measures
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Notes: The decile (quintile) income shares sda (s
q
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at) are for t = 2002.
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Figure A5: The Effect of Articles of Apparel when Disaggregating from HS4 to HS6 Level
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The βi,HS6’s are weighted by the number of observations. The size of the circle represents the
number of HS6 codes within a HS4 code. 4 observations are omitted in order to improve readablity.
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Appendix – Tables
Table A1: Some Examples of the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) Classification, Version 1992
HS 6-digit code Name
080130 Cashew nuts, fresh or dried
081010 Strawberries, fresh
091050 Curry
200970 Apple juice not fermented or spirited
220300 Beer made from malt
220830 Whiskies
220410 Grape wines, sparkling
220421 Grape wines nes, fortified wine or must, pack < 2l
220429 Grape wines, alcoholic grape must nes
220430 Grape must, unfermented, except as fruit juice
490199 Printed reading books, except dictionaries etc.
610421 Women’s, girls ensembles, of wool or hair, knit
610422 Women’s, girls ensembles, of cotton, knit
610423 Women’s, girls ensembles, synthetic fibres, knit
610429 Women’s, girls ensembles, of material nes, knit
841821 Refrigerators, household compression type
842211 Dish washing machines (domestic)
851650 Microwave ovens
870321 Automobiles, spark ignition engine of < 1000 cc
870322 Automobiles, spark ignition engine of 1000-1500 cc
870323 Automobiles, spark ignition engine of 1500-3000 cc
870324 Automobiles, spark ignition engine of > 3000 cc
871110 Motorcycles, spark ignition engine of < 50 cc
871120 Motorcycles, spark ignition engine of 50-250 cc
871130 Motorcycles, spark ignition engine of 250-500 cc
871140 Motorcycles, spark ignition engine of 500-800 cc
871150 Motorcycles, spark ignition engine of > 800 cc
871190 Motorcycles with other than a spark ignition engine
900410 Sunglasses
Notes: The HS has four hierarchical levels. The 1-digit level corresponds to
sections, the 2-digit level represents chapters, the 4-digit codes identify head-
ings and the 6-digit codes represent sub-headings. For instance, the HS4 code
8703, vehicles for transport of persons, comprises the following HS6 codes:
870310 (Snowmobiles, golf cars, similar vehicles), 870321/2/3/4 (Automo-
biles, spark ignition engine of <1000 cc/1000-1500 cc/1500-3000 cc/>3000
cc), 870331/2/3 (Automobiles, diesel engine of <1500 cc/1500-2500 cc/>2500
cc), 870390 (Automobiles nes including gas turbine powered).
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Table A2: Summary Statistics
min 25th perc. median mean 75th perc. max St. dev. N
Vnc 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.016 0.008 1.802 0.066 7’630
EMnc 0.000 0.021 0.138 0.252 0.409 1.000 0.277 7’630
IMnc 0.000 0.003 0.013 0.087 0.041 44.470 0.897 7’630
ln(Vnc) -16.977 -9.286 -6.854 -7.171 -4.791 0.589 3.106 7’630
ln(EMnc) -12.730 -3.885 -1.982 -2.639 -0.894 -0.000 2.276 7’630
ln(IMnc) -12.988 -5.769 -4.371 -4.532 -3.188 3.795 2.026 7’630
V˜nc 2.000 187.266 2567.169 1.95·105 30133.102 5.55·107 1.53·106 7’656
E˜Mnc 1.000 5.000 27.000 134.293 151.000 1237 227.569 7’656
I˜Mnc 2.000 27.245 87.432 407.024 284.205 53294 1666.251 7’656
ln(V˜nc) 0.693 5.233 7.851 7.792 10.313 17.832 3.384 7’656
ln(E˜Mnc) 0.000 1.609 3.296 3.301 5.017 7.120 2.040 7’656
ln(I˜Mnc) 0.693 3.305 4.471 4.491 5.650 10.884 1.700 7’656
EMnci 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.079 0.000 1.000 0.270 12’990’822
IMnci 2.000 8.190 32.000 1454.028 180.677 2.64·107 46139.906 1’028’150
ln(IMnci) 0.693 2.103 3.466 3.841 5.197 17.090 2.187 1’028’150
EMnci(HS4) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.136 0.000 1.000 0.343 3’224’526
IMnci(HS4) 2.000 11.768 56.545 3398 385 3.58e+07 94074 439’947
ln(IMnci(HS4)) 0.693 2.465 4.035 4.381 5.954 17.394 2.422 439’947
EMnci(HS2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.227 0.000 1.000 0.419 690’234
IMnci(HS2) 2.000 18.806 114.902 9546 975 3.77e+07 1.71e+05 156’603
ln(IMnci(HS2)) 0.693 2.934 4.744 5.059 6.883 17.445 2.699 156’603
EMnci(HS1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.355 1.000 1.000 0.479 206’040
IMnci(HS1) 2.000 27.011 210.541 20437 2155 3.78e+07 2.70e+05 73’149
ln(IMnci(HS1)) 0.693 3.296 5.350 5.622 7.676 17.448 2.928 73’149
Onc 0.028 0.224 0.440 0.490 0.768 1.000 0.287 7’630
Ox¯nc 0.250 0.500 0.925 1.225 1.713 4.505 0.910 7’630
Ownc 0.500 2.000 4.000 4.865 6.500 15.000 3.629 7’630
GDPpcc
GDPpcn
0.011 0.119 0.278 0.361 0.567 1.000 0.282 7’630
Notes: Year=2002. The income similarity measures Onc, Ox¯nc and O
w
nc are calculated with quintile and
decile data from time span 1992 until 2002. The unit of both Ownc and O
x¯
nc is 10’000$.
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Table A3: List of Countries and Dispersion of Similarity Measures within Countries
Country† income Onc Ox¯nc O
w
nc
group min median max min median max min median max N
Albania middle 0.123 0.444 0.952 0.295 0.598 1.073 1.5 2.5 2.5 58
Algeria middle 0.178 0.699 0.958 0.289 0.707 1.871 1.0 4.5 4.5 76
Argentina middle 0.295 0.543 0.920 0.366 1.215 3.257 1.5 8.0 10.5 73
Australia high 0.148 0.381 0.864 0.423 1.677 4.505 1.0 6.5 15.0 91
Austria high 0.044 0.197 0.941 0.385 2.200 3.722 1.0 6.0 12.5 97
Bangladesh low 0.088 0.507 0.992 0.257 0.401 0.836 1.0 2.0 2.0 72
Belgium-Lux. high 0.048 0.229 0.925 0.374 2.068 4.036 1.0 6.0 15.0 98
Bolivia middle 0.168 0.530 0.997 0.299 0.744 1.839 1.5 4.5 4.5 66
Brazil middle 0.260 0.674 0.955 0.250 0.875 3.645 0.5 7.0 12.0 83
Bulgaria middle 0.182 0.511 0.960 0.250 0.757 1.890 0.5 4.5 4.5 79
Burkina Faso low 0.127 0.444 0.987 0.263 0.532 1.290 1.0 3.0 3.0 64
Burundi low 0.044 0.095 0.955 0.256 0.313 0.385 1.0 1.0 1.0 39
Cambodia low 0.142 0.408 0.997 0.307 0.581 1.160 1.5 2.5 2.5 56
Cameroon middle 0.148 0.440 0.972 0.297 0.711 1.571 1.5 3.5 3.5 56
Canada high 0.042 0.255 0.940 0.250 2.004 4.137 0.5 6.0 15.0 97
Central Afr. Rep. low 0.097 0.324 0.997 0.292 0.428 0.750 1.5 1.5 1.5 39
Chile middle 0.321 0.523 0.933 0.378 1.158 4.410 1.5 7.5 15.0 75
China middle 0.174 0.729 0.940 0.250 0.588 1.744 0.5 4.0 4.0 90
Colombia middle 0.227 0.702 0.941 0.259 0.898 2.951 1.0 7.5 9.0 79
Costa Rica middle 0.272 0.547 0.931 0.375 1.129 2.954 1.5 8.0 9.0 71
Cote D’Ivoire low 0.132 0.555 0.994 0.282 0.502 1.195 1.0 2.5 2.5 75
Denmark high 0.069 0.221 0.941 0.500 2.158 3.652 1.0 6.0 12.0 93
Dominican Rp middle 0.244 0.647 0.909 0.326 1.103 2.783 1.5 8.0 8.0 63
Ecuador middle 0.198 0.600 0.964 0.283 0.932 2.653 1.0 7.5 7.5 69
Egypt middle 0.181 0.801 0.990 0.282 0.694 2.391 1.0 6.0 6.5 81
El Salvador middle 0.183 0.643 0.959 0.350 0.872 2.213 2.0 5.5 5.5 62
Ethiopia low 0.064 0.482 0.995 0.274 0.332 0.605 1.0 1.5 1.5 69
Finland high 0.069 0.236 0.944 0.500 2.100 3.421 1.0 6.5 11.5 90
Fm Czechoslovakia high 0.073 0.342 0.901 0.332 1.520 2.514 1.0 6.0 6.5 93
Fm Ussr middle 0.208 0.481 0.953 0.250 0.813 2.044 0.5 5.0 5.0 95
Fm Yugoslavia middle 0.142 0.326 0.857 0.250 0.955 1.814 0.5 4.0 4.0 97
France high 0.042 0.247 0.948 0.250 1.870 3.687 0.5 5.5 12.5 101
Gambia low 0.125 0.449 0.996 0.265 0.490 1.137 1.0 2.5 2.5 58
Germany high 0.039 0.240 0.922 0.250 1.918 3.742 0.5 5.5 13.0 101
Ghana low 0.083 0.648 0.994 0.250 0.348 0.767 0.5 1.5 1.5 82
Greece high 0.084 0.362 0.925 0.321 1.556 3.450 1.0 6.2 11.5 90
Guatemala middle 0.205 0.674 0.963 0.325 0.920 2.606 1.5 7.0 7.0 70
Guinea low 0.189 0.607 0.969 0.250 0.690 2.024 0.5 5.5 5.5 71
Guinea-Bissau low 0.127 0.401 0.992 0.257 0.564 1.154 1.0 2.5 2.5 52
Haiti low 0.132 0.408 0.962 0.299 0.511 1.055 1.5 2.5 2.5 56
Honduras middle 0.151 0.594 0.969 0.283 0.599 1.565 1.0 3.5 3.5 73
Hong Kong high 0.083 0.372 0.883 0.250 1.543 4.372 0.5 6.0 15.0 94
Hungary high 0.072 0.423 0.901 0.250 1.362 2.378 0.5 6.0 6.0 82
India middle 0.137 0.758 0.989 0.250 0.427 1.234 0.5 2.5 2.5 91
Indonesia middle 0.165 0.797 0.953 0.286 0.562 1.633 1.0 4.0 4.0 87
Iran middle 0.274 0.538 0.878 0.305 1.027 3.092 1.0 7.0 7.0 61
Ireland high 0.047 0.234 0.929 0.377 2.138 4.204 1.0 6.0 15.0 95
Israel high 0.129 0.412 0.954 0.472 1.561 3.571 1.0 6.5 12.0 83
Italy high 0.053 0.275 0.951 0.250 1.777 3.919 0.5 5.8 14.5 100
Jamaica middle 0.252 0.676 0.950 0.313 1.048 3.283 1.5 8.5 10.5 69
Japan high 0.057 0.271 0.882 0.250 1.826 3.798 0.5 6.0 12.5 98
† I report summary statistics of the dispersion of income similarity for each importer. As similarity is symmetric and as the
vast majority of aggregate trade flows is two-way (88%) a corresponding table for exporters looks very similar.
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[Table A3 continued]
Country income Onc Ox¯nc O
w
nc
group min median max min median max min median max N
Jordan middle 0.175 0.627 0.956 0.250 0.772 1.962 0.5 5.0 5.0 71
Kenya low 0.127 0.696 0.990 0.250 0.434 1.146 0.5 2.5 2.5 79
Korea Rp (South) high 0.098 0.372 0.925 0.311 1.468 3.188 1.0 6.0 10.0 94
Laos P.Dem.R low 0.083 0.229 0.946 0.307 0.668 0.769 1.5 1.5 1.5 30
Madagascar low 0.069 0.420 0.984 0.276 0.353 0.648 1.0 1.5 1.5 63
Malawi low 0.061 0.496 0.940 0.275 0.383 0.581 1.0 1.5 1.5 56
Malaysia middle 0.294 0.494 0.933 0.337 1.078 4.163 1.0 6.5 15.0 83
Mali low 0.125 0.584 0.996 0.264 0.440 1.163 1.0 2.5 2.5 66
Mauritania low 0.155 0.456 0.955 0.280 0.680 1.566 1.0 4.0 4.0 58
Mexico middle 0.274 0.555 0.920 0.310 0.956 3.551 1.0 6.5 11.5 85
Mongolia middle 0.097 0.177 0.917 0.296 0.655 0.794 1.5 1.5 1.5 39
Morocco middle 0.176 0.716 0.950 0.284 0.692 1.886 1.0 4.5 4.5 73
Mozambique low 0.092 0.504 0.992 0.257 0.403 0.858 1.0 2.0 2.0 62
Nepal low 0.129 0.185 0.972 0.312 0.806 1.004 2.0 2.0 2.0 36
Netherlands high 0.032 0.195 0.933 0.250 2.113 3.996 0.5 5.5 14.0 101
New Zealand high 0.138 0.415 0.922 0.459 1.651 3.901 1.0 7.0 14.0 81
Nicaragua middle 0.133 0.486 0.997 0.308 0.526 1.213 1.5 2.5 2.5 69
Niger low 0.055 0.424 1.000 0.263 0.318 0.512 1.0 1.0 1.0 62
Nigeria low 0.113 0.670 0.998 0.250 0.394 1.012 0.5 2.0 2.0 89
Norway high 0.055 0.205 0.781 0.500 2.399 4.505 1.0 6.5 15.0 91
Pakistan low 0.136 0.472 0.989 0.282 0.583 1.227 1.0 2.5 2.5 63
Panama middle 0.236 0.680 0.961 0.295 0.950 2.814 1.0 8.0 8.5 73
Papua N.Guinea low 0.167 0.510 0.946 0.283 0.555 1.209 1.0 2.5 2.5 54
Paraguay middle 0.181 0.489 0.990 0.341 0.963 2.292 2.0 6.0 6.0 56
Peru middle 0.182 0.675 0.969 0.300 0.790 2.399 1.5 6.5 6.5 75
Philippines middle 0.167 0.640 0.969 0.283 0.618 1.864 1.0 4.5 4.5 78
Poland middle 0.151 0.396 0.857 0.250 1.158 2.432 0.5 6.5 6.5 81
Portugal high 0.129 0.432 0.954 0.448 1.520 3.616 1.0 6.5 12.5 89
Romania middle 0.175 0.511 0.960 0.319 0.720 1.662 1.0 3.5 3.5 77
Rwanda low 0.055 0.531 0.939 0.257 0.365 0.583 1.0 1.0 1.0 56
Senegal low 0.110 0.516 0.998 0.269 0.418 0.998 1.0 2.0 2.0 75
Somalia low 0.028 0.078 0.917 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.5 0.5 0.5 33
South Africa middle 0.243 0.706 0.925 0.250 0.662 4.121 0.5 6.0 14.0 95
Spain high 0.053 0.278 0.938 0.250 1.800 3.851 0.5 6.0 14.0 98
Sri Lanka middle 0.185 0.487 0.925 0.278 0.969 2.881 1.0 8.0 8.0 63
Sweden high 0.036 0.236 0.944 0.250 2.032 3.855 0.5 6.2 13.5 92
Switzerland high 0.094 0.262 0.940 0.500 1.962 4.306 1.0 6.0 15.0 96
Thailand middle 0.249 0.669 0.961 0.250 0.832 2.941 0.5 6.5 9.0 87
Trinidad-Tobago high 0.268 0.522 0.915 0.357 1.238 4.018 1.0 7.5 14.5 75
Tunisia middle 0.278 0.553 0.954 0.306 0.883 2.785 1.0 6.0 6.0 75
Turkey middle 0.199 0.707 0.955 0.293 0.763 2.357 1.0 6.0 6.0 81
USA high 0.050 0.265 0.905 0.250 1.790 4.428 0.5 5.5 15.0 101
Uganda low 0.083 0.475 0.994 0.256 0.371 0.750 1.0 1.5 1.5 64
United Kingdom high 0.046 0.253 0.951 0.250 1.832 3.962 0.5 5.5 15.0 101
Untd Rp Tanzania low 0.055 0.617 1.000 0.250 0.297 0.510 0.5 1.0 1.0 72
Uruguay middle 0.259 0.539 0.967 0.353 1.069 2.624 1.5 7.5 7.5 68
Venezuela middle 0.264 0.519 0.967 0.327 1.091 2.654 1.0 7.5 7.5 75
Vietnam low 0.130 0.381 0.994 0.312 0.638 1.170 1.5 2.5 2.5 58
Yemen low 0.055 0.248 0.994 0.275 0.357 0.500 1.0 1.0 1.0 54
Zambia low 0.102 0.443 0.992 0.269 0.435 0.936 1.0 2.0 2.0 62
Zimbabwe low 0.151 0.493 0.947 0.282 0.787 1.882 1.0 4.5 4.5 55
Notes: Income classes are according to World Bank List of Economies July 2008 (http://go.worldbank.org/D7SN0B8YU0).
Economies are grouped according to 2007 GNI per capita (calculated using the World Bank Atlas method). low income: $1
- $935, middle income: $936 - $11,455, high income: $11,456 or more. The unit of both Ox¯nc and O
w
nc is 10’000$.
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Table A4: Summary Statistics of Similarity Measures by NN, SS and NS Country Pairs
min 25th perc. median mean 75th perc. max St. dev. N
overlap, Onc
North-North 0.297 0.642 0.750 0.724 0.834 0.954 0.143 699
South-South 0.142 0.576 0.766 0.723 0.888 1.000 0.195 3’196
North-South 0.028 0.152 0.221 0.247 0.315 0.915 0.127 3’735
all observations 0.028 0.224 0.440 0.490 0.768 1.000 0.287 7’630
average income of
overlap area, Ox¯nc
North-North 1.452 2.664 3.062 2.971 3.309 4.505 0.576 699
South-South 0.250 0.347 0.477 0.560 0.728 1.967 0.269 3’196
North-South 0.250 0.901 1.334 1.468 1.954 4.410 0.747 3’735
all observations 0.250 0.500 0.925 1.225 1.713 4.505 0.910 7’630
width of overlap area,
Ownc
North-North 6.000 11.500 12.500 11.829 14.000 15.000 2.626 699
South-South 0.500 2.000 2.500 3.429 4.500 15.000 2.172 3’196
North-South 0.500 2.500 4.000 4.790 6.500 15.000 3.276 3’735
all observations 0.500 2.000 4.000 4.865 6.500 15.000 3.629 7’630
Notes: A country belongs to the “North” if it is classified as a high income country by the World Bank. Middle
and low income countries appertain to the “South”, see table A3. The unit of both Ox¯nc and O
w
nc is 10’000$.
Table A5: Summary Statistics of Bilateral Trade Margins by NN, SS and NS Country Pairs
min 25th perc. median mean 75th perc. max St. dev. N
ln(Vnc)
North-North -15.134 -5.874 -4.668 -4.807 -3.338 0.229 2.130 699
South-South -16.243 -9.967 -7.796 -7.772 -5.574 0.589 2.950 3,196
North-South -16.977 -9.092 -6.582 -7.099 -4.699 0.580 3.172 3,735
all observations -16.977 -9.286 -6.854 -7.171 -4.791 0.589 3.106 7,630
ln(EMnc)
North-North -9.513 -0.717 -0.326 -0.589 -0.106 -0.000 0.920 699
South-South -12.730 -4.988 -2.873 -3.497 -1.637 -0.019 2.438 3,196
North-South -11.803 -3.247 -1.690 -2.289 -0.855 -0.001 1.948 3,735
all observations -12.730 -3.885 -1.982 -2.639 -0.894 -0.000 2.276 7,630
ln(IMnc)
North-North -10.572 -5.084 -4.168 -4.218 -3.161 0.229 1.522 699
South-South -11.510 -5.553 -4.194 -4.275 -2.924 3.605 2.038 3,196
North-South -12.988 -6.077 -4.581 -4.810 -3.383 3.795 2.060 3,735
all observations -12.988 -5.769 -4.371 -4.532 -3.188 3.795 2.026 7,630
Notes: A country belongs to the “North” if it is classified as a high income country by the World Bank. Middle
and low income countries appertain to the “South”, see table A3.
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Table A7: Ync – All Years
(a) Onc, calculated with quintile and decile data from time span
1992 to 2002 (102 countries) 1997 to 2007 (91 countries) 1999 to 2009 (88 countries)
year ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc) ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc) ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc)
1995 1.200??? 0.637??? 0.563???
(0.167) (0.157) (0.141)
1996 1.111??? 0.728??? 0.382???
(0.156) (0.152) (0.134)
1997 1.153??? 0.591??? 0.562??? 1.185??? 0.831??? 0.354??
(0.144) (0.140) (0.126) (0.164) (0.167) (0.153)
1998 1.133??? 0.673??? 0.460??? 1.192??? 0.823??? 0.370??
(0.148) (0.140) (0.126) (0.167) (0.161) (0.150)
1999 1.183??? 0.523??? 0.660??? 1.229??? 0.670??? 0.559??? 1.141??? 0.666??? 0.475???
(0.142) (0.135) (0.125) (0.166) (0.158) (0.149) (0.177) (0.168) (0.160)
2000 1.198??? 0.671??? 0.527??? 1.268??? 0.727??? 0.540??? 1.135??? 0.703??? 0.432???
(0.139) (0.134) (0.125) (0.163) (0.158) (0.149) (0.173) (0.168) (0.158)
2001 1.057??? 0.634??? 0.423??? 1.204??? 0.812??? 0.392??? 1.037??? 0.809??? 0.228
(0.142) (0.137) (0.125) (0.162) (0.154) (0.149) (0.171) (0.164) (0.156)
2002 1.204??? 0.755??? 0.449??? 1.218??? 0.871??? 0.347?? 1.049??? 0.829??? 0.220
(0.138) (0.138) (0.128) (0.163) (0.164) (0.153) (0.171) (0.172) (0.161)
2003 1.470??? 0.836??? 0.634??? 1.326??? 0.796??? 0.530???
(0.161) (0.158) (0.145) (0.171) (0.165) (0.152)
2004 1.618??? 0.913??? 0.705??? 1.404??? 0.776??? 0.628???
(0.157) (0.148) (0.147) (0.165) (0.156) (0.155)
2005 1.765??? 0.912??? 0.853??? 1.537??? 0.800??? 0.737???
(0.154) (0.144) (0.139) (0.163) (0.154) (0.147)
2006 1.487??? 0.678??? 0.810??? 1.217??? 0.603??? 0.613???
(0.154) (0.143) (0.140) (0.162) (0.149) (0.145)
2007 1.697??? 0.871??? 0.825??? 1.410??? 0.619??? 0.791???
(0.145) (0.139) (0.129) (0.154) (0.146) (0.138)
(b) Ownc, calculated with quintile and decile data from time span
1992 to 2002 (102 countries) 1997 to 2007 (91 countries) 1999 to 2009 (88 countries)
year ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc) ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc) ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc)
1995 0.122??? 0.049??? 0.074???
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
1996 0.132??? 0.061??? 0.071???
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
1997 0.120??? 0.049??? 0.072??? 0.095??? 0.048??? 0.047???
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
1998 0.113??? 0.038??? 0.075??? 0.094??? 0.031?? 0.063???
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
1999 0.119??? 0.047??? 0.072??? 0.095??? 0.036??? 0.059??? 0.096??? 0.039??? 0.057???
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
2000 0.116??? 0.055??? 0.061??? 0.092??? 0.039??? 0.053??? 0.091??? 0.037??? 0.055???
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
2001 0.106??? 0.053??? 0.052??? 0.089??? 0.053??? 0.035??? 0.089??? 0.053??? 0.036???
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
2002 0.114??? 0.065??? 0.048??? 0.091??? 0.059??? 0.032??? 0.093??? 0.067??? 0.026??
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
2003 0.117??? 0.071??? 0.047??? 0.113??? 0.074??? 0.040???
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
2004 0.100??? 0.069??? 0.031??? 0.092??? 0.070??? 0.023?
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
2005 0.112??? 0.061??? 0.050??? 0.107??? 0.065??? 0.042???
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
2006 0.104??? 0.063??? 0.042??? 0.095??? 0.062??? 0.033???
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
2007 0.103??? 0.055??? 0.047??? 0.094??? 0.046??? 0.048???
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
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[Table A7 continued]
(c) Onc and Ox¯nc, calculated with quintile and decile data from time span
1992 to 2002 (102 countries) 1997 to 2007 (91 countries) 1999 to 2009 (88 countries)
year ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc) ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc) ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc)
1995 Onc 0.748??? 0.444??? 0.304??
(0.171) (0.164) (0.147)
Ox¯nc 0.530
??? 0.225??? 0.304???
(0.064) (0.061) (0.061)
1996 Onc 0.670??? 0.513??? 0.157
(0.157) (0.157) (0.141)
Ox¯nc 0.528
??? 0.258??? 0.271???
(0.060) (0.059) (0.056)
1997 Onc 0.764??? 0.388??? 0.376??? 0.836??? 0.672??? 0.164
(0.146) (0.145) (0.132) (0.170) (0.175) (0.163)
Ox¯nc 0.455
??? 0.237??? 0.218??? 0.317??? 0.144?? 0.173???
(0.057) (0.055) (0.053) (0.060) (0.057) (0.057)
1998 Onc 0.767??? 0.516??? 0.251? 0.860??? 0.758??? 0.102
(0.151) (0.146) (0.130) (0.174) (0.173) (0.158)
Ox¯nc 0.406
??? 0.174??? 0.232??? 0.289??? 0.056 0.233???
(0.056) (0.055) (0.050) (0.057) (0.057) (0.054)
1999 Onc 0.770??? 0.284?? 0.486??? 0.836??? 0.505??? 0.331?? 0.734??? 0.530??? 0.204
(0.143) (0.141) (0.129) (0.171) (0.168) (0.160) (0.186) (0.181) (0.175)
Ox¯nc 0.457
??? 0.265??? 0.192??? 0.338??? 0.142??? 0.196??? 0.312??? 0.104? 0.208???
(0.054) (0.051) (0.048) (0.056) (0.053) (0.052) (0.060) (0.057) (0.057)
2000 Onc 0.785??? 0.461??? 0.324?? 0.889??? 0.571??? 0.318?? 0.731??? 0.564??? 0.167
(0.144) (0.140) (0.132) (0.172) (0.168) (0.161) (0.188) (0.181) (0.177)
Ox¯nc 0.427
??? 0.218??? 0.210??? 0.317??? 0.131?? 0.186??? 0.301??? 0.104? 0.197???
(0.052) (0.049) (0.047) (0.056) (0.052) (0.051) (0.059) (0.055) (0.056)
2001 Onc 0.717??? 0.427??? 0.290?? 0.892??? 0.645??? 0.246 0.715??? 0.672??? 0.043
(0.147) (0.145) (0.131) (0.169) (0.165) (0.158) (0.183) (0.179) (0.171)
Ox¯nc 0.370
??? 0.225??? 0.145??? 0.272??? 0.146??? 0.127?? 0.251??? 0.106?? 0.144???
(0.051) (0.048) (0.047) (0.054) (0.050) (0.051) (0.057) (0.053) (0.054)
2002 Onc 0.838??? 0.518??? 0.320?? 0.876??? 0.632??? 0.244 0.680??? 0.554??? 0.126
(0.142) (0.144) (0.136) (0.170) (0.176) (0.165) (0.183) (0.188) (0.178)
Ox¯nc 0.392
??? 0.254??? 0.138??? 0.299??? 0.209??? 0.090? 0.292??? 0.217??? 0.074
(0.050) (0.049) (0.046) (0.053) (0.052) (0.051) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055)
2003 Onc 1.000??? 0.570??? 0.429??? 0.821??? 0.489??? 0.333??
(0.166) (0.167) (0.153) (0.181) (0.179) (0.165)
Ox¯nc 0.426
??? 0.241??? 0.185??? 0.413??? 0.251??? 0.161???
(0.052) (0.051) (0.047) (0.057) (0.055) (0.050)
2004 Onc 1.298??? 0.714??? 0.583??? 1.113??? 0.572??? 0.541???
(0.161) (0.152) (0.151) (0.174) (0.163) (0.164)
Ox¯nc 0.309
??? 0.191??? 0.117?? 0.257??? 0.180??? 0.077
(0.052) (0.047) (0.048) (0.056) (0.050) (0.052)
2005 Onc 1.442??? 0.756??? 0.687??? 1.232??? 0.637??? 0.595???
(0.160) (0.149) (0.144) (0.173) (0.162) (0.156)
Ox¯nc 0.307
??? 0.149??? 0.159??? 0.262??? 0.140??? 0.122??
(0.050) (0.046) (0.045) (0.054) (0.048) (0.048)
2006 Onc 1.152??? 0.494??? 0.658??? 0.922??? 0.431??? 0.491???
(0.154) (0.145) (0.144) (0.166) (0.154) (0.152)
Ox¯nc 0.329
??? 0.180??? 0.149??? 0.261??? 0.153??? 0.109??
(0.049) (0.046) (0.045) (0.052) (0.046) (0.048)
2007 Onc 1.433??? 0.744??? 0.689??? 1.186??? 0.520??? 0.666???
(0.147) (0.142) (0.134) (0.158) (0.152) (0.144)
Ox¯nc 0.254
??? 0.122??? 0.131??? 0.197??? 0.087? 0.110??
(0.047) (0.044) (0.043) (0.050) (0.046) (0.046)
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered
by country pairs) are given in parentheses. Controls: geographic distance, dummies for free trade agreement, currency union,
common border, common legal system, common language, colonial ties, dummy variable allowing for a different intercept for
NN, SS, NS and SN trade flows (τnc), importer and exporter fixed effects (Ac and An). Sample: countries with population >
1 million, HS6 codes which include consumer goods. This table reports the estimation results from equation (13), estimated
for each year separately. The dependent variables are defined in equations (9)-(11). The income similarity measures are
defined in equations (4)-(6).
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Table A8: Y˜nc – All Years
(a) Onc, calculated with quintile and decile data from time span
1992 to 2002 (102 countries) 1997 to 2007 (91 countries) 1999 to 2009 (88 countries)
year ln(eVnc) ln(gEMnc) ln(gIMnc) ln(eVnc) ln(gEMnc) ln(gIMnc) ln(eVnc) ln(gEMnc) ln(gIMnc)
1995 1.225??? 0.465??? 0.760???
(0.165) (0.093) (0.113)
1996 1.106??? 0.426??? 0.680???
(0.154) (0.089) (0.105)
1997 1.195??? 0.480??? 0.715??? 1.211??? 0.566??? 0.645???
(0.144) (0.084) (0.099) (0.163) (0.096) (0.116)
1998 1.159??? 0.469??? 0.691??? 1.225??? 0.542??? 0.683???
(0.147) (0.081) (0.101) (0.166) (0.093) (0.116)
1999 1.208??? 0.526??? 0.682??? 1.257??? 0.603??? 0.654??? 1.172??? 0.562??? 0.611???
(0.142) (0.080) (0.099) (0.165) (0.091) (0.116) (0.177) (0.098) (0.124)
2000 1.225??? 0.581??? 0.645??? 1.294??? 0.606??? 0.688??? 1.147??? 0.516??? 0.631???
(0.139) (0.079) (0.096) (0.162) (0.091) (0.114) (0.172) (0.098) (0.120)
2001 1.063??? 0.500??? 0.563??? 1.200??? 0.569??? 0.631??? 1.039??? 0.488??? 0.550???
(0.141) (0.080) (0.096) (0.162) (0.091) (0.112) (0.170) (0.097) (0.117)
2002 1.216??? 0.646??? 0.570??? 1.222??? 0.666??? 0.556??? 1.051??? 0.586??? 0.464???
(0.137) (0.079) (0.095) (0.162) (0.091) (0.114) (0.170) (0.098) (0.119)
2003 1.447??? 0.691??? 0.756??? 1.304??? 0.598??? 0.706???
(0.160) (0.089) (0.112) (0.170) (0.096) (0.119)
2004 1.618??? 0.731??? 0.887??? 1.414??? 0.597??? 0.817???
(0.156) (0.087) (0.108) (0.164) (0.092) (0.115)
2005 1.744??? 0.695??? 1.049??? 1.516??? 0.565??? 0.951???
(0.154) (0.082) (0.107) (0.162) (0.087) (0.113)
2006 1.474??? 0.594??? 0.880??? 1.205??? 0.459??? 0.746???
(0.153) (0.082) (0.107) (0.160) (0.087) (0.113)
2007 1.690??? 0.616??? 1.074??? 1.405??? 0.476??? 0.929???
(0.145) (0.078) (0.102) (0.154) (0.083) (0.109)
(b) Ownc, calculated with quintile and decile data from time span
1992 to 2002 (102 countries) 1997 to 2007 (91 countries) 1999 to 2009 (88 countries)
year ln(eVnc) ln(gEMnc) ln(gIMnc) ln(eVnc) ln(gEMnc) ln(gIMnc) ln(eVnc) ln(gEMnc) ln(gIMnc)
1995 0.126??? 0.039??? 0.087???
(0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
1996 0.130??? 0.046??? 0.084???
(0.014) (0.008) (0.009)
1997 0.124??? 0.046??? 0.078??? 0.098??? 0.039??? 0.060???
(0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
1998 0.115??? 0.035??? 0.080??? 0.095??? 0.027??? 0.068???
(0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
1999 0.119??? 0.042??? 0.077??? 0.096??? 0.033??? 0.062??? 0.097??? 0.038??? 0.059???
(0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
2000 0.119??? 0.046??? 0.072??? 0.094??? 0.033??? 0.061??? 0.092??? 0.034??? 0.058???
(0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
2001 0.106??? 0.037??? 0.069??? 0.089??? 0.032??? 0.057??? 0.089??? 0.032??? 0.058???
(0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009)
2002 0.115??? 0.047??? 0.068??? 0.092??? 0.037??? 0.055??? 0.094??? 0.039??? 0.055???
(0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
2003 0.116??? 0.038??? 0.078??? 0.112??? 0.039??? 0.073???
(0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
2004 0.101??? 0.038??? 0.063??? 0.094??? 0.035??? 0.059???
(0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
2005 0.110??? 0.036??? 0.075??? 0.106??? 0.035??? 0.071???
(0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.007) (0.010)
2006 0.104??? 0.035??? 0.069??? 0.095??? 0.031??? 0.064???
(0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007) (0.010)
2007 0.103??? 0.028??? 0.075??? 0.094??? 0.025??? 0.069???
(0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009)
48
[Table A8 continued]
(c) Onc and Ox¯nc, calculated with quintile and decile data from time span
1992 to 2002 (102 countries) 1997 to 2007 (91 countries) 1999 to 2009 (88 countries)
year ln(eVnc) ln(gEMnc) ln(gIMnc) ln(eVnc) ln(gEMnc) ln(gIMnc) ln(eVnc) ln(gEMnc) ln(gIMnc)
1995 Onc 0.768??? 0.274??? 0.494???
(0.169) (0.098) (0.116)
Ox¯nc 0.531
??? 0.222??? 0.309???
(0.064) (0.036) (0.045)
1996 Onc 0.676??? 0.236?? 0.440???
(0.156) (0.092) (0.108)
Ox¯nc 0.514
??? 0.227??? 0.287???
(0.059) (0.035) (0.043)
1997 Onc 0.801??? 0.299??? 0.501??? 0.852??? 0.410??? 0.443???
(0.145) (0.086) (0.101) (0.169) (0.101) (0.122)
Ox¯nc 0.461
??? 0.211??? 0.250??? 0.326??? 0.142??? 0.184???
(0.057) (0.033) (0.041) (0.060) (0.034) (0.044)
1998 Onc 0.792??? 0.328??? 0.464??? 0.897??? 0.440??? 0.457???
(0.150) (0.085) (0.104) (0.173) (0.099) (0.122)
Ox¯nc 0.407
??? 0.156??? 0.251??? 0.285??? 0.089??? 0.196???
(0.055) (0.032) (0.039) (0.057) (0.033) (0.041)
1999 Onc 0.798??? 0.350??? 0.448??? 0.866??? 0.449??? 0.417??? 0.768??? 0.392??? 0.376???
(0.143) (0.083) (0.100) (0.171) (0.098) (0.122) (0.186) (0.107) (0.135)
Ox¯nc 0.452
??? 0.193??? 0.259??? 0.336??? 0.132??? 0.204??? 0.309??? 0.130??? 0.179???
(0.053) (0.032) (0.038) (0.056) (0.033) (0.041) (0.060) (0.035) (0.045)
2000 Onc 0.813??? 0.412??? 0.401??? 0.917??? 0.475??? 0.442??? 0.749??? 0.371??? 0.377???
(0.144) (0.083) (0.101) (0.171) (0.098) (0.122) (0.186) (0.107) (0.134)
Ox¯nc 0.425
??? 0.174??? 0.251??? 0.315??? 0.109??? 0.205??? 0.297??? 0.108??? 0.189???
(0.052) (0.030) (0.036) (0.055) (0.031) (0.040) (0.059) (0.033) (0.043)
2001 Onc 0.722??? 0.372??? 0.350??? 0.886??? 0.467??? 0.419??? 0.713??? 0.399??? 0.315??
(0.146) (0.084) (0.101) (0.169) (0.097) (0.118) (0.182) (0.106) (0.127)
Ox¯nc 0.369
??? 0.139??? 0.230??? 0.273??? 0.089??? 0.184??? 0.253??? 0.070?? 0.183???
(0.051) (0.029) (0.036) (0.053) (0.030) (0.039) (0.057) (0.032) (0.042)
2002 Onc 0.848??? 0.502??? 0.346??? 0.875??? 0.538??? 0.337??? 0.678??? 0.457??? 0.221?
(0.141) (0.083) (0.099) (0.169) (0.097) (0.121) (0.182) (0.106) (0.130)
Ox¯nc 0.392
??? 0.153??? 0.238??? 0.302??? 0.112??? 0.190??? 0.294??? 0.102??? 0.192???
(0.050) (0.029) (0.035) (0.052) (0.030) (0.039) (0.056) (0.032) (0.042)
2003 Onc 0.983??? 0.556??? 0.427??? 0.807??? 0.451??? 0.355???
(0.166) (0.094) (0.117) (0.181) (0.104) (0.128)
Ox¯nc 0.418
??? 0.122??? 0.296??? 0.405??? 0.120??? 0.285???
(0.052) (0.030) (0.038) (0.057) (0.032) (0.041)
2004 Onc 1.292??? 0.616??? 0.676??? 1.116??? 0.497??? 0.619???
(0.160) (0.090) (0.112) (0.173) (0.098) (0.121)
Ox¯nc 0.312
??? 0.109??? 0.202??? 0.261??? 0.088??? 0.173???
(0.052) (0.029) (0.037) (0.056) (0.031) (0.040)
2005 Onc 1.420??? 0.600??? 0.820??? 1.210??? 0.479??? 0.731???
(0.159) (0.085) (0.112) (0.172) (0.092) (0.120)
Ox¯nc 0.308
??? 0.090??? 0.218??? 0.262??? 0.074?? 0.189???
(0.050) (0.028) (0.036) (0.054) (0.029) (0.038)
2006 Onc 1.143??? 0.487??? 0.657??? 0.917??? 0.372??? 0.545???
(0.153) (0.083) (0.108) (0.164) (0.090) (0.116)
Ox¯nc 0.324
??? 0.105??? 0.219??? 0.254??? 0.076??? 0.178???
(0.049) (0.027) (0.036) (0.051) (0.028) (0.038)
2007 Onc 1.423??? 0.563??? 0.860??? 1.178??? 0.448??? 0.730???
(0.146) (0.080) (0.104) (0.158) (0.086) (0.112)
Ox¯nc 0.256
??? 0.051?? 0.205??? 0.199??? 0.024 0.175???
(0.047) (0.026) (0.034) (0.050) (0.027) (0.037)
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered
by country pairs) are given in parentheses. Controls: geographic distance, dummies for free trade agreement, currency union,
common border, common legal system, common language, colonial ties, dummy variable allowing for a different intercept for
NN, SS, NS and SN trade flows (τnc), importer and exporter fixed effects (Ac and An). Sample: countries with population >
1 million, HS6 codes which include consumer goods. This table reports the estimation results from equation (13), estimated
for each year separately. The dependent variables are defined in equation (12). The income similarity measures are defined
in equations (4)-(6).
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Table A10: βˆi – Estimating Equation (17) for each HS4 Product Category separately
min 25th perc. median mean 75th perc. max N
HS4 codes, except apparel -2.94 -0.26 0.28 0.27 0.90 2.86 279
HS4 codes, apparel -2.10 -1.01 -0.71 -0.79 -0.57 0.14 34
all HS4 codes -2.94 -0.51 0.14 0.16 0.79 2.86 313
Notes: This table reports summary statistics of the distribution of βˆi. βˆi is obtained by estimating equation (17)
separately for each HS4 code i, i.e. estimating ln(IMnci) = αi+βiOnc+τ
′
ncγi+Aci+Ani+ nci for each i separately.
Table A11: Ynci – Apparel versus Non-Apparel Categories
HS6 codes containing apparel HS6 codes not containing apparel
EMnci ln(IMnci) EMnci ln(IMnci)
Mean 0.092 3.668 0.076 3.889
Standard deviation 0.290 2.115 0.265 2.204
OLS Cosslett OLS Cosslett
Onc 0.132??? -0.827??? -0.558??? 0.115??? 0.202?? 0.580???
[0.135] [-0.104] [-0.070] [0.128] [0.025] [0.071]
(0.009) (0.143) (0.156) (0.006) (0.083) (0.100)
Selection? No Yes No Yes
# observations 2,400,366 221,701 221,701 10,590,456 806,449 806,449
# regressors 450 450 550 1245 1244 1344
Adjusted R2 0.371 0.410 0.427 0.304 0.292 0.323
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors (clustered by country pairs) are given in round brackets. Standardized beta coefficients are given in
square brackets. Controls: geographic distance, dummies for free trade agreement, currency union, common
border, common legal system, common language, colonial ties, dummy variable allowing for a different
intercept for NN, SS, NS and SN trade flows (τnc), importer, exporter and HS6 code fixed effects (Ac,
An and Ai). Sample: countries with population > 1 million, HS6 codes which include consumer goods.
Year=2002. Income distributions are calculated with quintile and decile data from 1992 until 2002. This
table reports the estimation results from equation (16), (17) and (18), where J = 100. The dependent
variables are defined in equation (7) and (8). The income similarity measure Onc is defined in equation (4).
A HS6 code belongs to apparel if its higher-ranking HS2 code is 61 (articles of apparel, accessories, knit or
crochet) or 62 (articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crocheted).
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Table A13: Ynci – All Years
year EMnci ln(IMnci) EMnci ln(IMnci) EMnci ln(IMnci)
OLS Cosslett OLS Cosslett OLS Cosslett
1995 Onc 0.120
??? -0.186? -0.097 0.087??? -0.155 -0.277??
(0.007) (0.105) (0.115) (0.008) (0.109) (0.116)
Ox¯nc 0.033
??? -0.044 0.202???
(0.004) (0.044) (0.047)
Ownc 0.011
??? -0.016? 0.016?
(0.001) (0.009) (0.010)
1996 Onc 0.123
??? -0.138 0.050 0.092??? -0.092 -0.100
(0.007) (0.103) (0.119) (0.008) (0.107) (0.120)
Ox¯nc 0.030
??? -0.066 0.172???
(0.004) (0.042) (0.044)
Ownc 0.011
??? -0.017? 0.025??
(0.001) (0.009) (0.010)
1997 Onc 0.122
??? -0.136 0.136 0.092??? -0.090 -0.026
(0.007) (0.098) (0.114) (0.008) (0.101) (0.113)
Ox¯nc 0.030
??? -0.068? 0.168???
(0.004) (0.040) (0.041)
Ownc 0.010
??? -0.020?? 0.025???
(0.001) (0.008) (0.009)
1998 Onc 0.111
??? -0.139 0.046 0.080??? -0.099 -0.126
(0.006) (0.088) (0.102) (0.007) (0.090) (0.100)
Ox¯nc 0.030
??? -0.060 0.180???
(0.004) (0.037) (0.038)
Ownc 0.010
??? -0.019?? 0.022???
(0.001) (0.008) (0.009)
1999 Onc 0.109
??? -0.159? 0.127 0.078??? -0.117 -0.058
(0.006) (0.087) (0.100) (0.008) (0.089) (0.097)
Ox¯nc 0.029
??? -0.061? 0.192???
(0.004) (0.036) (0.036)
Ownc 0.010
??? -0.019?? 0.026???
(0.001) (0.008) (0.008)
2000 Onc 0.111
??? -0.148? 0.195? 0.088??? -0.074 0.079
(0.006) (0.088) (0.106) (0.007) (0.090) (0.104)
Ox¯nc 0.022
??? -0.100??? 0.119???
(0.004) (0.035) (0.036)
Ownc 0.009
??? -0.025??? 0.020??
(0.001) (0.008) (0.008)
2001 Onc 0.113
??? -0.116 0.227?? 0.092??? -0.034 0.130
(0.006) (0.088) (0.104) (0.008) (0.090) (0.103)
Ox¯nc 0.020
??? -0.114??? 0.094???
(0.004) (0.035) (0.035)
Ownc 0.009
??? -0.026??? 0.016?
(0.001) (0.008) (0.008)
2002 Onc 0.118
??? -0.074 0.296??? 0.099??? 0.009 0.213??
(0.006) (0.090) (0.106) (0.008) (0.091) (0.105)
Ox¯nc 0.018
??? -0.120??? 0.080??
(0.004) (0.034) (0.035)
Ownc 0.008
??? -0.027??? 0.015?
(0.001) (0.007) (0.008)
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered
by country pairs) are given in parentheses. Controls: geographic distance, dummies for free trade agreement, currency union,
common border, common legal system, common language, colonial ties, dummy variable allowing for a different intercept for
NN, SS, NS and SN trade flows (τnc), importer, exporter and HS6 code fixed effects (Ac, An and Ai). Sample: countries
with population > 1 million, HS6 codes which include consumer goods. Income distributions are calculated with quintile
and decile data from 1992 until 2002. This table reports the estimation results from equation (16), (17) and (18), where
J = 100, for each year between 1995 and 2002. The dependent variables are defined in equation (7) and (8). The income
similarity measures are defined in equations (4)-(6).
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Table A14: Yncit – Pooled Cross Sections for all Levels of Aggregation
EMncit ln(IMncit) EMncit ln(IMncit) EMncit ln(IMncit)
OLS Cosslett OLS Cosslett OLS Cosslett
HS6 Onc 0.116
??? -0.141 0.127 0.089??? -0.082 -0.014
(0.006) (0.088) (0.103) (0.008) (0.090) (0.101)
Ox¯nc 0.025
??? -0.084?? 0.147???
(0.004) (0.035) (0.036)
Ownc 0.010
??? -0.022??? 0.019??
(0.001) (0.007) (0.008)
HS4 Onc 0.167
??? 0.132 0.335??? 0.116??? 0.171? 0.146
(0.008) (0.090) (0.112) (0.009) (0.093) (0.107)
Ox¯nc 0.049
??? -0.050 0.221???
(0.005) (0.036) (0.039)
Ownc 0.015
??? -0.004 0.034???
(0.001) (0.008) (0.009)
HS2 Onc 0.206
??? 0.452??? 0.487??? 0.134??? 0.357??? 0.301???
(0.009) (0.086) (0.116) (0.010) (0.089) (0.107)
Ox¯nc 0.070
??? 0.113??? 0.228???
(0.004) (0.034) (0.042)
Ownc 0.019
??? 0.035??? 0.041???
(0.001) (0.008) (0.010)
HS1 Onc 0.224
??? 0.672??? 0.210? 0.150??? 0.456??? 0.201?
(0.011) (0.091) (0.115) (0.012) (0.093) (0.104)
Ox¯nc 0.071
??? 0.249??? 0.018
(0.005) (0.036) (0.042)
Ownc 0.020
??? 0.067??? 0.007
(0.001) (0.008) (0.010)
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered
by country pairs) are given in parentheses. Controls: geographic distance, dummies for free trade agreement, currency
union, common border, common legal system, common language, colonial ties, dummy variable allowing for a different
intercept for NN, SS, NS and SN trade flows (τnc), importer-year, exporter-year and HS code fixed effects (Act, Ant and Ai).
Sample: countries with population > 1 million, HS codes which include consumer goods. 1995-2002. Income distributions
are calculated with quintile and decile data from 1992 until 2002. This table reports the estimation results from equation
(16), (17) and (18), where J = 100. The dependent variables are defined in equation (7) and (8). The income similarity
measures are defined in equations (4)-(6).
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